. . .Which is an announcement by the Ukrainian Security Service on Thursday that it has opened an criminal investigation into just how Ukraine managed to sell $3bn of some curious bonds to Russia in the last months of Viktor Yanukovych’s government. Read more
With Argentina in default, the pari passu saga has become a long, ludicrous, gruelling standoff — which plenty of financial institutions and Argentina’s restructured bondholders have been trying to escape.
And then running smack into the US court system.
On Friday the Second Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal by Citibank to get local-law, US dollar-denominated restructured bonds (the ones with the ISIN confusion) out of the pari passu embargo: Read more
This is well below the €100bn-plus forecasts that were consensus…
And so to the website of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation:
There is a paper to be written on how UK structured finance nomenclature borrows from the topography of a Britain which is sort of (but not quite) familiar, and which feels reassuringly permanent. We suppose it’s like the Shipping Forecast.
Aire Valley, Arkle, Arran, Brass (that one’s from Yorkshire), Darrowby, Granite (famously), Lanark, Leofric… Read more
Cross-posted from Lex Live — Lex’s new, free, blog. Lex has also been writing notes this week on the consequences of independence for sovereign debt, banks, and Scotland’s oil industry…
Or, why it isn’t surprising at all that RBS and Lloyds would move their respective holding companies to the UK, probably overnight, if Scotland voted to become independent. Despite the odd packaging of this as NEWS by the UK press.
It’s the emergency liquidity (or ELA). Click chart to enlarge:
Cross-posted from Lex Live — which is Lex’s new, free (you don’t even have to register) blog giving an insight on what Lex writers are reading and thinking…
Not that negative zone – Europe: Read more
Draghi: The Eurosystem will purchase a broad portfolio of simple and transparent asset-backed securities (ABSs)
— ECB (@ecb) September 4, 2014 Read more
The Holders of a Majority in aggregate principal amount Outstanding of the Debt Securities of any Series may at any time remove the Trustee and appoint a successor trustee for the Debt Securities of such Series…
– Argentine exchange bond trust indenture (2005) Read more
Sam Jones (formerly of this parish) writes in the FT about how the conflict in Ukraine has revealed the capacity for a new type of warfare.
This is one that has “exploded the notion that expansive communications technologies and economic interdependence were fostering a kind of grand bargain.” Against it, the great power arrayed on the other side can do little, despite its considerable conventional might.
Quite so. Take, for example, this story from Bloomberg on Friday… Read more
“I’m a little nervous,” the President of Argentina told the nation on Tuesday night.
President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner had just sent a draft law to the Argentine congress.
This would offer restructured bondholders to route around New York law into Argentina’s domestic jurisdiction, set up local payment for them in the meantime, and in general, attempt to remodel bonds free of holdout lawsuits and a default that could last a long time.
And on Wednesday the market more or less retorted that it prefers to hold the defaulted paper anyway. Read more
Ukraine claimed at pixel time to have fired on a number of Russian tanks crossing its borders.
Being invaded by Russia is not very conducive to a country’s GDP. But also, bizarre as it seems if its armour really is aflame in the Donbas, Russia is also the owner of Ukrainian sovereign debt. This has some precarious terms (for the borrower) restricting growth in debt to GDP to below 60 per cent. Read more
That is, Argentina filed a case at the International Court of Justice in the Hague on Thursday — claiming that US court decisions in the pari passu saga have violated its sovereign immunity in public international law.
Note that Argentina originally waived immunity within the New York law bonds owned by the holdouts. Read more
Banco Espirito Santo has recently, and spectacularly, shown how many sins of the past lie beneath Portuguese corporate life.
Also recently, readers of the Independent (and Matt Levine) would have come across what must be one of the most pointlessly complicated derivatives transactions ever — and also involving a Portuguese company. Read more
They come from Deutsche Bank’s analysts — who have in the meantime suspended their ‘buy’ rating on the London-listed Sierra Leone iron ore miner.
Background: a related party transaction, a director resignation, an internal investigation into $50m of shareholders’ money also paid to a related party, and a four-fifths share-price drop in a year. (And a 25 per stake held by the Shangdong Iron and Steel.) Read more
There goes an $80bn bear hug. Full statement from the 21st Century Fox chairman and chief executive:
We viewed a combination with Time Warner as a unique opportunity to bring together two great companies, each with celebrated content and brands. Our proposal had significant strategic merit and compelling financial rationale and our approach had always been friendly. However, Time Warner management and its Board refused to engage with us to explore an offer which was highly compelling. Additionally, the reaction in our share price since our proposal was made undervalues our stock and makes the transaction unattractive to Fox shareholders. These factors, coupled with our commitment to be both disciplined in our approach to the combination and focused on delivering value for the Fox shareholders, has led us to withdraw our offer. Read more
See the attached for an important announcement by the Brasil Sovereign II Fundo de Investimento de Divida Externa… (H/T Bloomberg)
It is getting to a week since holders of Argentina’s restructured bonds first had the opportunity to cry default and demand full and immediate payment. So we thought we’d ask.
And as Morgan Stanley’s analysts pointed out on Tuesday, there is $13bn of paper out there eligible to be accelerated — $30bn, counting cross-default clauses in debt which has not had payments missed yet. Read more
Click for the Bank of Portugal’s announcement of the resolution of Banco Espirito Santo: Read more
That was the Argentine economy minister, Axel Kicillof, shortly before pixel time, having announced a (rejected) ‘offer’ of the same terms as Argentina’s restructured debt to the holdouts; blamed Judge Griesa; and otherwise prepared his country for default. Direct negotiations, in short, are over for now. Read more
Update – Midnight UK time: Argentine press was reporting at pixel time that the country’s banks may provide collateral to the holdouts for a temporary stay. Argentina would then use the stay to ask restructured bondholders to consent to waiving the RUFO clause. (Using private banks to pay the collateral would avoid a RUFO trigger.) Also at pixel time, Argentina’s economy minister had entered negotiations in New York — so something was up.
The talks may move quickly into Wednesday. But the emergency stay request in the original post below shows some of the issues here… Read more
We are one day away from Argentina’s second default this century. Drama or farce?
Farce. For all the confusion that was on show in Judge Griesa’s hearing last week, about whether Argentina’s restructured local-law bonds should join the foreign-law debt within the pile of paper at risk…
At least holders of these bonds will be OK after all on Wednesday.
Only just this once, though. And they were let off for a reason which underlines tensions we’ve been noting in the pari passu saga between enhanced powers to enforce sovereign debt, and the complexity of international finance. Read more
Was Rosneft an arm of the Russian state in 2004?
For anyone looking at its shareholder list — or the background of Igor Sechin, chairman of the board of directors at the time — back then, it might hardly seem a taxing question. But it’s not the question the arbitration tribunal saw as important in Monday’s Yukos ruling.
This was whether Rosneft was specifically acting on behalf of the state when it played its part in the dismemberment of Yukos in 2004. (State responsibility in international law is a tricky subject.)
In an astonishing passage, the tribunal is sceptical that there is evidence of Rosneft acting in this way — until it notices the reflections of the man in the Kremlin from the time… Read more
Another excerpt from Monday’s ruling by an arbitration tribunal, awarding $50bn to be paid by Russia to Yukos ex-shareholders…
As part of the damages from Russia’s expropriation of Yukos’ assets — the tribunal also had to work out interest. This is an important part of any arbitration case looking at financial losses incurred years ago. Although actually, there is surprisingly little guidance on what rate to choose. And the rate used by the tribunal here is (excuse the pun) interesting. Read more
Here’s how the tribunal of the Permanent Court of Arbitration worked out the figure, after finding in favour of former Yukos shareholders on Monday…
What happens when you raise rates by 2.5 percentage points, within a period of six months, for an economy that might only grow 0.2 per cent this year?
We’re not sure. Read more
With less than a fortnight until Argentina risks defaulting on its restructured debt, there will be another hearing in the pari passu saga later on Tuesday. After a look at Argentina’s position, now for what Judge Griesa’s hearing will focus on — restructured bondholders who argue that he has no jurisdiction over them…
Notably, local-law restructured bondholders. Read more
“Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air,” Keynes wrote at the end of the General Theory, “are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back.”
In Argentina, the scribblers are sovereign bond contract draughtsmen. Read more
Over on Lex this week we’ve been pondering the finer points of what shareholders get out of tax inversions.
So… from the text of AbbVie’s planned £32bn merger with Shire, announced on Friday: Read more
From the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control on Wednesday:
The following transactions by U.S. persons or within the United States involving the persons listed below are hereby prohibited: transacting in, providing financing for, or otherwise dealing in new debt of longer than 90 days maturity of these persons (listed below), their property, or their interests in property…
Note that wording carefully. “US persons” could extend beyond the US. Meanwhile “new debt of longer than 90 days maturity” could extend beyond US dollar debt.
It does not, however, include US dollar clearing generally, the US Treasury says. Nor, it seems, CDS which references prohibited underlying debt.
Now note whose debt — not all transactions; debt — US banks, US clearing systems, and US investors may be prevented from dealing with accordingly: Read more