Negative interest rates
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- India’s payments revolution
- Treating stablecoins like ETFs
- A history lesson on why we need central banks
- Stablecoins as a euphemism for full-reserve banking
- BIS: Moving fast and stablising things
- Is Libra really the world’s most ambitious international settlement system?
- Zuckerbuck vs PayPal vs China
- A G7 stablecoin report that tells it how it is
- Suddenly Facebook’s Libra is all about defending “the Free World” from China
- Libra is imperialism by stealth
- France says it won’t allow Libra in Europe
- ECB board member slams “cartel-like” Libra
- Facebook fights back against Libra criticism
- Libra myth-busting (video)
- Nick Clegg: “I'm not just providing a PR gloss”
- A pound of flesh for your Libra inclusion
- Why closed-loop systems like Libra won't change the world
- Facebook's Libra will not help the unbanked
- Facebook’s Libra: blockchain, but without the blocks or chain
There’s a chronic paradox at the heart of stablecoin-based payment systems that will render them cost-prohibitive.
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- This is nuts, this is the crash.
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- Cloud software is nuts, and it’s crashing
- Gilets are nuts, when’s the crash?
- Zoom is nuts, when’s the crash?
- This is nuts, when's the maturity?
- Beyond Meat is beyond reason, when's the crash?
- Salesforce/Tableau: cloud cuckoo consolidation
- Extel shocker: here comes the crash?
Outside the US, the debt market is officially bonkers.
It’s almost BoJ comprehensive assessment time with Kuroda’s massive JGB purchases and NIRP policy standing naked beneath the spotlights awaiting judgement from their own creators. Part of that judgment involves the pain that a NIRP and QQE induced flattening of the yield curve has wrought on financials. Thus, as we’ve talked about already, part of the recommended remedy might involve some sort of Japanese Operation Twist to steepen said yield curve and help out said financials. Of course, the range of things the BoJ can actually do is large and the subject of predicable disagreement. So before we get to the yield curve question, here’s some summary for those who want it. Those who don’t can skip down to below the breaks.
The short answer: Both bondholders and issuers could be in an awkward spot. Many corporate bonds have “floors” in place, which means their coupon payments can’t go below zero. But in a recent note, S&P Global Market Intelligence calls attention to a host of floating-rate securities that don’t have coupon floors.
Janet Yellen opened the festivities at this year’s Jackson Hole economic symposium by musing on what central bankers had learned since the crisis and how they can deal with future recessions in a world where interest rates are far lower than in the past. Unsurprisingly, bond-buying and “forward guidance” featured prominently in Yellen’s narrative of successful new tools. (On the other hand, scholars have estimated the combined impact of these measures was an unemployment rate a mere 0.13 percentage points below where it would have been using purely conventional instruments.)
For most of human history, financiers believed in the sanctity of the Lower Bound, imagining that if we crossed from the world of positive interest rates into the Hades of negative numbers all manner of disasters would befall society. In the real world, it took six years of fallout from a global financial crisis to push us boldly below zero; in the FT Alphaville Fantasy Football League world, it took barely a fortnight.
Fine, the Japanese stock market maybe isn’t paying attention to the Bank of Japan the way it used to. But did things have to get this mean? From CLSA’s Benthos: Faced with the problem of when to fire its last bullet, the Bank of Japan decided to fire half a bullet at half-cock. Now, speculators will be free to take liberties, fortified by the knowledge that the BoJ has only enough powder left to miss the mark one more time. The yen surged derisively. Governor Haruhiko Kuroda warned he has ample room to extend bankkiller Nirp. Three years after saying he’d achieve 2% inflation in two years, he said he would achieve 2% inflation in two years. It seems the BoJ has entered the Age of Impotence.
Or moved into riskier assets by the ECB’s corporate bond buying machine (CSPP to its friends). Resistance may be futile but we’ll have to wait to make sure. To move into those riskier assets you’d like to think that eventually the search for yield will become a real, worthwhile thing in Europe again. And not everyone buys that – Credit Suisse for example point out that over the last 2.5yrs in particular government bonds (bunds) have outperformed both high and low yielding credit assets. Their point is that “the time to hunt for yield as a dominant strategy (rather than as a short-term trade) might actually be when yields start to rise.” But BofAML’s European credit team think it’ll maybe happen a bit sooner:
This is a guest post from Richard Koo, chief economist of the Nomura Research Institute and, amongst many other things, author of “The Holy Grail of Macroeconomics, Lessons from Japan’s Great Recession”, which lays out his balance sheet recession thesis in detail. The post is an updated extract from his most recent note for Nomura and reproduced here, with his permission, for your arguing pleasure… The US, the UK, Japan, and Europe all implemented quantitative easing (QE) policies, but the understanding of how those policies work apparently differs greatly from country to country, leading to very different outcomes. With the US economy doing better than the rest, there has been some debate in Europe as to why that is the case.
Despite popular belief, we take no comfort in the decline in interest rates and argue that it should be viewed as a bad sign. So says Shyam Rajan of BoAML’s liquidity insight report team, and in so doing echoes the thoughts and sentiments of probably the entire banking industry. We’ve noted before – channeling Paul Krugman, no less — that zero rates (even more so negative rates) are not a banker’s cup of tea. Indeed, with little capacity to pass negative rates onto customers, the lower for longer scenario compromises hallowed net interest margins, the key source of predictable and sustained revenue for banks. All other services from origination to advisory collect one-off based fees. As great and balance-sheet light as they may be, they’re variable and thus unpredictable, hence inconsistent with the historical reason for buying bank stock.
From Citi’s global head of G10 strategy, Steven Englander, who wonders if markets have begun pricing another round in: US economic data have been soggy, other than labor market data, which means that we get one positive data release a month followed by a series of disappointments. This is reflected in the Citi’s economic surprise index (Figure 1), which has been dropping since mid‐April and where a 0 level would be considered strong outperformance. My conjecture is that investors have begun to price out June/July hiking risk they are beginning to reject the view that there is a high‐probability fed funds path that is as shallow as the market is pricing in. If you really think that a full hike is not likely until May 2017 (as is now priced in), you have to think there is a non‐negligible probability that the economy is so bad that you would want to cut.
Jefferies: Japan has a fever and the only prescription is NGDP targeting and zero coupon perpetual bonds
We’re paraphrasing a bit in the headline but Jefferies do think the Japanese authorities are in a corner, painted in by a strengthening yen, tighter monetary conditions and a drop in inflation expectations.
The first question is whether there was a lovely new, but secret, currency accord agreed at the G20 in Shanghai in February. The answer is: Probably not.
This post will be made up of two pieces. The first will try to explain why JPY continues to defy Japan’s negative rate-led demand for currency weakness. The second will add words to this picture from HSBC which proclaims a break in the (so-called, he adds hastily) currency wars, predicated mostly on said JPY strength: At last sighting JPY was hovering at about Y108. That’s not good if you are the BoJ’s Kuroda or the overarching Abe, particularly because FX strength can beget more FX strength. The question is why did the yen start this slide: