- Did Soros really give Tesla a “vote of confidence”?
- At a crypto conference in New York, it feels like 2017 all over again
- Egregious expectations - Intelsat edition
- Bitcoin cash is expanding into the void
- Stop getting The Flintstones wrong
- Bond investors do not care if Argentina is solvent in 100 years
- Ubiquiti Networks: of cash and borrowed time
- “We're very disappointed in you, Spotify”
- 'Sex redistribution' and the means of reproduction
- Tesla probably needs to raise capital this year
- No entitlement crisis in America
- Free cash flow to whom?
- Hey crypto bros! Journalism ≠ advertising
- Human capital and the jobs guarantee
- This is a tech bubble, when's the crash?
- The magic of adjustments: ebitla-dee-da
- FUD, inglorious FUD
- A complex analysis reaches same conclusion as simple one: hedge funds suck
- The jobs guarantee and human-capital “nationalisation”
- These hedge fund numbers can't be right
And the award for best long-term growth in living standards goes to...
In this guest post, Manmohan Singh of the International Monetary Fund and Phil Prince of Pine River Capital Management argue that the use of longer-term securities as collateral for short-term borrowing should affect how central bankers think about “money”. All views expressed are of the authors only and do not represent the opinions of the IMF or Pine River Capital.
The ECB’s direct buying of corporate bonds is also a way of accelerating the development of European capital markets.
A whopper of a post on why crypto fiat is not what it seems. TL;DR — there is an economic cost in expanding the central bank balance sheet to everyone, which is what crypto fiat is really all about.
Any legislative measures offering regulatory and tax relief to green bonds demand clearer rules on what constitute such assets if gaming is to be avoided. But such measures will also enrich the nascent green industry.
They may have been investment-grade, but Steinhoff’s bonds have been a bad deal for the ECB.
How are central banks expected to function if the world’s smartest economists and policymakers can’t even agree on the basics?
Random variation in American financial supervision reveals important insights into the dangers of “forbearance”.
The Fed was suppressing volatility by absorbing convexity risk. Soon it won’t be.