It can take the form of a report on money-laundering in Cyprus. Or the opaque process by which Troika debt sustainability analyses are drawn up. Emergency liquidity assistance to banks, even.

– UBS analysts John Paul Crutchley and Alastair Ryan, 2009

Pretty striking, then, that they’ve now gone cautious on Greece.

Artificially cheap rates of interest might be forced on the embattled sovereign’s debt, local banks might be obliged to buy mis-priced government paper, exchange controls may be erected, and so on. Ordinary people, it seemed, could be financially repressed without realising they were in fact the victims.

There was no discussion back then of outright expropriation or a “tax”, as insured (and uninsured) depositors at Cypriot banks are now being forced to bear.

Presenting the Cyprus bailout’s “upfront one-off stability levy” for depositors in Cypriot banks:

Gabriel Sterne at Exotix says the run was one of the “most astounding sovereign bond rallies of all time”, but that the bonds are now over-bought. The declining possibility of a Grexit, he says, is more than fully priced in (his emphasis):