

**Exhibit 6: Summary of Policy Makers' Toolkit**

|   | <b>Federal Reserve</b>   | <b>European Central Bank</b>  | <b>Bank of Japan</b>  | <b>Bank of England</b>   | <b>People's Bank of China</b>   |
|---|--|---|---|--|---|
| <b>Last Policy Action</b>   | The Fed has embarked on a path to hike policy rates with first rate hike of 25bps in Dec-15.   | In Dec-15, maintaining its easing bias, ECB has cut deposit rates to -30bp and extended the QE programme to run until at least Mar-17 .   | BOJ is on easing path with quantitative and qualitative monetary easing with a negative interest rate policy (QQENIRP). In Jan-2016, BOJ added negative interest rate policy to its QQE program.  | On Feb 4th, BOE maintained bank rate at 0.5% and stock of asset purchase of 375 billion pounds. Currently, the BOE's MPC sees the next most likely move as tightening rather than easing.  | With continued downward pressures on growth and inflation, the PBOC has been on an easing path. In Oct-15, PBoC cut deposit rates by 25bps to 1.5% and RRR by 50 bps to 17%.  |
| <b>Available Toolkit for Easing Monetary Policy</b>               | - Forward guidance;<br>- The level of interest rates;<br>- Its balance sheet, and;<br>- Emergency Liquidity programs.  | - Forward guidance;<br>- The level of interest rates;<br>- Open market operations;<br>- Standing facilities;<br>- Minimum reserve requirements, and<br>- CB balance sheet expansion   | - The level of interest rates;<br>- Quantity of asset purchase program<br>- Quality of asset purchase program (on type of assets to purchase)   | - The level of interest rates<br>- Traditional QE (buying gilts)<br>- Buying other assets (eg. Corporate bonds, loans or equities)<br>- Targeted funding to banks<br>- Macro-prudential policies   | -Liquidity management: (1) open market operations (2) RRR (3) lending facilities<br>- The level of interest rates<br>- Window guidance to banks for lending<br>- Prudential measures to direct lending to specific sectors.   |
| <b>Next Policy Action if Macro Outlook Deteriorates</b>           | Employ its communication policy by reverting to forward guidance, promising to remain on the sidelines until further notice  | Tweak its public sector purchase program, including a faster pace of purchases  | Cut negative interest rates further and/or expanding quantitative and qualitative easing measures.  | Take up interest rate cuts till zero bound and then take up gilt QE  | Cut interest rates and RRR alongside additional capital controls to manage trilemma pressures   |
| <b>Legal Hurdles to Implementation of Unconventional Measures</b> | <b>Negative interest rates:</b> No known legal restriction but Fed lawyers will need to do further work before providing an legal opinion.<br><b>Emergency liquidity programs:</b> Still possible to be used but Fed will have to seek authorisation from Treasury Secretary, more problematic will be fact that Fed will have disclose the users of these facilities.<br><b>Scope of asset purchase program:</b> Fed does not have the legal authority to buy stocks or corporate bonds | <b>Asset purchase program:</b> Potential tool kit includes changing the terms of public sector purchase program, buying private sector debt, buying equities and buying bank loans. This toolkit is subject to legal uncertainty around the application of the Treaty on European Union and ECB's own staute. Moreover, there could be additional constraints arising from the fact that ECB's status is a multinational central bank without a single treasury counterpart for its P&L.<br><b>Fiscal spending financed by the central bank (helicopter money):</b> Treaty on the European bans such direct financing by the ECB. | <b>Asset purchase program:</b> The BOJ Act stipulates that it "cannot engage in other activities besides its operation" unless it obtains approval by the Minister of Finance and Prime Minister. It has obtained approval under this provision for ETF and J-REIT purchases, and theoretically it could also purchase other assets if it receives such approval.<br><b>Direct funding of government spending:</b> BoJ is prohibited from direct underwriting of government bonds or extending credit directly to the government in principle under Fiscal Act. | <b>Negative rates or QE:</b> No legal restrictions on negative policy rates or further quantitative easing measures. Nevertheless, in a 2013 note to the Treasury Committee, former BOE Deputy Governor Charlie Bean said that it would "probably not be possible to hold bank rate below minus ½ per cent (or thereabouts) for more than a year or two" without provoking movements into cash by banks/consumers, "unless the convertibility of bank reserves into cash were to be restricted". | We do not envisage any legal hurdles for taking up above mentioned policy tools   |
| <b>Effectiveness and Efficiency of Tools</b>                      | While in theory and in practice, powerful tools are available for conduct of monetary policy, being close to zero lower bound and with a massive balance sheet the Fed does not have as much room to provide accomodation as it has had historically when battling economic downturns.   | Monetary easing measures implemented in 2015 have been effective in easing financial conditions. Amongst the yet untried measures, buying non-financial and bank debt could be most powerful.   | We expect only a marginal positive impact from NIRP on prices and the real economy, and additional rate reductions might have even smaller (or perhaps adverse) impact. Asset purchases is running into the practical problem of the reluctance of financial institutions to sell bonds to BoJ.   | After cutting rates to zero, policy makers will likely embark on a further round of gilt QE , though the marginal effectiveness of such a move has diminished.   | The first challenge is for the PBOC to be able to ease aggressively considering the trilemma pressures (with risk of rise in capital outflows). Secondly, while China has enough room to use its conventional monetary policy tool kit, the effectiveness of policy action is constrained due to falling returns on incremental credit. |

Source: Federal Reserve, European Central Bank, Bank of Japan, Bank of England, People's Bank of China, Morgan Stanley Research