Markets live chat transcript for the chat ending at 12:09 on 16 Jul 2009. Participants in this chat were: Neil Hume, FT (NH) Paul Murphy, FT (PM)
16 Jul 2009 11:00 BST *DJ Nokia 2Q Sales EUR9.9B
16 Jul 2009 11:00 BST *DJ Nokia 2Q Sales EUR9.9B Vs EUR13.16B
16 Jul 2009 11:00 BST *DJ Nokia Devices & Services 2Q Sales EUR763B Vs EUR1,565B
16 Jul 2009 11:00 BST *DJ Nokia 2Q Oper Pft EUR775M Vs Pft EUR2.05B
16 Jul 2009 11:00 BST *DJ Nokia 2Q EPS EUR0.15 Vs EPS EUR0.37
following a comprehensive review, it has decided to bring forward the shut down
of Teletext’s loss-making analogue television services. Transmission will end
in January 2010, rather than 2012 as previously envisaged. In addition,
Teletext will halt a number of its digital television services from the same
date.
consensus at $0.25 (Bloomberg) as preannounced. Gross margin of 88% and adj operating margin of 47% was slightly below our expectation. ASPs were similar to Q1 at $400k. Deferred revenue increased by 4% vs.
Q1 which is significantly below our expectation. Net debt at the end of Q1 was $44m. Cash conversion (Adj CFFO/EBITDA) was c. 63%, which is very disappointing in our view.
$173.8m (i.e. Autonomy and Interwoven) and our expected level of $180m+. At Q1 Autonomy noted a fall in Interwoven
deferred revenue due to certain customers delaying the renewal of maintenance agreements. In our view, with currency
benefiting the deferred revenue balance this is again a disappointing result and we note there has been little organic
deferred revenue growth in the business which we believe led to the poor cash conversion of the past.
from historical R&D capitalisation, and the net credit of $2.2m represents an operating margin benefit of c 2.4%.
We believe cash conversion of c. 63% (our preliminary estimate) is very disappointing considering the expectation of
>100% this quarter.
Post the pre-announcement the stock has been weak relative to the market due to, we believe, concerns about the slowdown in top-line momentum. In our view the underlying growth has slowed materially since the closing of Interwoven and we believe the EPS outperformance cannot be sustained without a momentum returning to revenue. The stock trades on 21x 2009E PER or 30x a cash adjusted EV/NOPAT
thought have opened up with 2 brokers taking the stands on either side of the
case. We are on the bullish side and so I will attempt to explain below why the
bear case that has been put about this morning is wrong and I hope Mike Lynch
will follow suit on the conf call starting now.
We say 109%, bears say 65%. The reason is that because they have a DSO of 90
days your calculation to get cash conversion should be Cash in divided by
EBITDA in the previous 90 days, or quarter. So in this case 65.4 / 60 (Q1
EBITDA) = 109%. The bears are using Q2 EBITDA which has risen significantly
since Q1, this is a growth company after all. There is a complexity thanks to
when Interwoven EBITDA was integrated into the Autonomy numbers, 8.4m are
included in Q1, 8m weren’t, if you add these on to the 60m the cash conversion
is still 95%, or solid.
170m of deferred revenues compared with our expectation of 180m but this is
entirely explained by the closure of the services division. This was poorly
explained in the results.
There was a question that growth would stall. Organic growth was 19%. Pretty
conclusive. 15x is the same as SAP despite SAP being mature and Autonomy being a growth
name. I think if the management can do a good job on the call this could move
today (especially given the poor performance into numbers) and if not I still
think this stock is good value here.
Record Revenue of $27.7 Billion
* Earnings per share reduced by TARP repayment ($0.27) and FDIC special assessment ($0.10)
* Record firmwide revenue of $27.7 billion, resulting in record revenue for the first half of 2009 (on a managed basis 1):
o Reported record Investment Banking Fees and Fixed Income Markets revenue in the Investment Bank; maintained #1 rankings for Global Debt, Equity and Equity-related, and Global Investment Banking Fees
o Continued earnings and revenue growth in Commercial Banking; solid performance in Asset Management, Treasury & Securities Services and Retail Banking
o Added $2 billion to credit reserves, bringing the total to $30 billion; firmwide loan loss coverage ratio of 5%2 as of June 30, 2009
o Repaid in full the $25 billion TARP preferred capital
* Continued lending and foreclosure prevention efforts:
o Extended approximately $150 billion in new credit to consumers, corporations, small businesses, municipalities, and non-profits
o Approved 138,000 trial mortgage modifications in the second quarter, bringing total foreclosures prevented since 2007 to 565,000
(All comparisons refer to the prior-year quarter except as noted)
* Ranked #1 in Global Debt, Equity and Equity-related; #1 in Global Equity and Equity-related; #1 in Global Long-Term Debt; #1 in Global Syndicated Loans; and #3 in Global Announced M&A, based on volume, for the six months ended June 30, 2009, according to Thomson Reuters.
* Ranked #1 in Global Investment Banking Fees for the six months ended June 30, 2009, according to Dealogic.
* Return on Equity was 18% on $33.0 billion of average allocated capital.
* End-of-period loans retained were $64.5 billion, down 9% from the prior year. End-of-period fair-value and held-for-sale loans were $6.8 billion, down by $12.9 billion, or 65%, from the prior year, driven primarily by a reduction in leveraged loan exposure.
11:35 16Jul09 RTRS-U.S. TREASURY NOTE FUTURES
take over from fixed income as growth drivers. More importantly, we will
be listening to managements’ guidance for the rest of the year.
Indeed, the favourable environment for the fixed-income business in H1
may not remain as strong for a number of reasons, in our view:
increased in high-yield. This suggests to us that the borrowing surge of Q1 09
has come to an end. The high levels of issuance in the first half of the year will
have completed many companies’ borrowing programmes for the FY, meaning
that H2 revenues are likely to disappoint relative to H1.
2. There is some anecdotal evidence of bid-ask spreads in fixed income
markets beginning to narrow as second-tier players return to the market and
incumbents attempt to preserve market share gains in the face of overall falling
volumes.
3. Market shares of established players may erode marginally as the healthy
profit booked in fixed income entices some players to carefully return to the
market.
statements (Are spreads coming down? Are volumes slowing?) than on
actual Q2 numbers.
Because investors currently look at both P/TE and P/E valuation methods, any
beat to Q2 earnings has a small positive valuation impact as TE increases, but
the sustainability of the returns is what matters most, in our view.
However, on this front we remain cautious on both capital requirements and
volume development in a poor economic context.
We have recently upgraded UBS to Outperform and continue to like BNPP
for capital management (benefit of the Fortis acquisition), potential for earnings
momentum (Fortis acquisition and fixed-income revenues) and for being the
only AA-rated investment bank in the Western world (although with a negative
outlook). We rate DB Underperform and SG Neutral, mostly on the back of
earnings sustainability and remaining balance sheet risks.
guidance of £135m; SPD is guiding to “at least” £140m for the
current year. As recently flagged, the final dividend has been passed and debt
is targeted to reduce below £400m by end FY10E. UK retail gross margins are
below our forecast and could come under further pressure as SPD targets
inventory reductions. We remain Sellers.
reflects stronger sales, but weaker margins than forecast. With “core” store
growth of c7%, underlying UK retail LFL sales look to have been flat across the
year, implying mid single digit growth in H2. The company reports (for the first
time) a LFL gross profit contribution growth of 2.5%, excluding the effect of
foreign currency moves.
Kaupthing as a result of a dispute with the administrators, so underlying net debt
is close to our estimate. The group will need to refinance its £500m banking
facility this year, and has also announced its intention to reduce debt below
£400m by the year end, principally, it appears, by reducing working capital (we
assume inventory reduction). This implies to us that the margin pressure seen
last year is likely to continue.
Within the new FY10E guidance of EBITDA of “at least £140m”, the company
notes that the effect of the 2010 World Cup on sales and margins is likely to fall
into the FY11E financial year. We note that the history of these significant
events is a large boost to sales often largely offset by heavy margin dilution.
The company has also given details of its proposed employee bonus share
scheme which requires EBITDA of £155m in FY10E, and for the second stage
to trigger, £195m in FY11E. In our view, achieving these results would require
significant capacity withdrawal in the sector which looks less likely than before.
We remain Sellers of the shares, but place our forecasts and target price under
review.
The company now expects underlying EBITDA for next year to be £140m, this is a slight
upgrade to what the market was expecting.
However with lower interest payments, PBT adj for next year could easily be around
85m, a significant upgrade. We were expecting PBT adj of just 65m.
Trading in UK Retail has been good but margins have inevitably come under pressure
following the higher US dollar.
The final dividend has scrapped, but this was largely expected.
Debt levels are now being targeted to be below 400m implying the company now has net
debt/EBITDA of 2.9x.
Going forward we believe a less competitive retailing environment, better weather, easier
comps, improved sterling rates and the 2010 World Cup will help deliver earnings
momentum. There could easily be 10-11p of earnings for FY2011.
If £85m, is the number for next year then the stock is trading on just 9.5x PE. BUY.
Fresnillo has reported Q2/H1 production numbers this morning, with the company delivering record quarterly and H1 silver production figures which leave them comfortably on track to hit FY09E guidance and our estimates. We see no material changes to our forecasts following today’s announcement, although we are likely to make minor changes to the mine-by-mine production split.
Production: group attributable silver production in Q2 of 9,587koz is up 4% QoQ and 7% YoY. H1 production of 18.8Moz is up 8% YoY. Both Q2 and H1 represent production records for the company, which was achieved due to increased efficiency at the Fresnillo mine, higher grades at Ciénega and Herradura and the processing of development ore from the Fresnillo II project contributing (an albeit modest) 67koz. Gold production is up sequentially (+5%), due to an increase in grade at Ciénega where production has now stabilised, but down YoY due to the issues at Ciénega. Zinc and lead production running slightly behind our full year run rate, although they are minor contributors to group revenue (c.7% in FY09E). Most importantly, silver and gold production is well on track to hit our FY09E estimates.
Costs: the statement reiterates previous guidance that USD unit costs are falling relative to last year, due to a combination of a more favourable MXN:USD fx rate and reductions in inputs costs (consumables, steel etc.). Offsetting that, electricity prices and wage costs have increased. Our base case models unit costs flat in local currency terms, implying a 16% YoY fall in USD terms for FY09E; we remain comfortable with that estimate at this stage.
Valuation and recommendation
Since listing in May last year Fresnillo has established itself as the default silver play in the UK market and today’s results should further cement that position, in our view. Having said that, the momentum has dissipated from precious metals stocks recently due to the economy having seemingly moved past the worst of the economic crisis and inflation related to the massive government stimulus packages yet to emerge. Silver will, however, benefit from any upturn in global IP given 75% of demand is industrial, while any weakness in the USD would also be positive. Fresnillo trades on PERs of 29.0x and 21.5x for FY09E and FY10E respectively against the peer group on 23.3x and 14.7x. P/NPV of 1.27x on CazE and 1.05x on spot is supportive, in our view, given the world class nature of Fresnillo’s assets. IN-LINE.
resolving remote servers from the Assanka FT platform, which we’ve
dropped a quick fix into place for. We’ll look at longer-term fixes and
additional safeties now.
We are removing Northgate from the Conviction Buy List following the announcement of a rights issue and
accompanying share price volatility. While we believe the fundamental outlook is improving, and supports our
retained Buy rating on the stock, we expect further rights issue-related volatility in the near-term. Since being
added to the Conviction Buy List on April 9, 2009, Northgate’s shares have declined 56%, vs. the FTSE
World Europe’s gain of 2%. Over 12 months, Northgate’s shares are down 83%, vs. the index’ -20%. Based
on the expected new share count and use of funds, our 6-month price cum-rights price target is 30p.
Our current view on the stock, as set out in more detail in our report, “Position of strength”, June 24, 2009, is
that the share price reaction to the announcement of the rights issue is excessive. We believe the
fundamentals for the company are improving, as rental rates improve, utilization picks up, and residual value
pricing recovers from trough levels.
Following better than expected FY09 results, we raise our EPS forecasts for FY10 and FY11 to 37.5p and
51p from 5.5p and 41.0p, respectively (unadjusted for the rights issue). We also incorporate the benefit of £6
mn of announced cost savings.
On an ex-rights basis, we estimate the stock is trading at only 3.9x our FY11 EPS estimate vs. its historical
10th percentile multiple of 9x. We are adjusting our price target to reflect blended 10th percentile forward P/E
and EV/EBITDA multiples. Our 6-month cum-rights price target is 30p, which implies 89% potential upside to
the current combined TERP and theoretical rights price (15p).
Key downside risks to our view and price target include continued technical pressure prior to the completion
of the rights issue, lower than forecast utilization, an inability to sell used vans and a reversal of recent
favourable economic trends in the UK and Spain.
added to the Conviction Buy List on April 9, 2009, Northgate’s shares have declined 56%, vs. the FTSE
World Europe’s gain of 2%.
Northgate has announced a rights issue & placing to raise £108m net of fees. We
had hoped for closer to £250m, although this was always going to be challenging
given a market cap of £50m. Following the rights issue, we estimate net
debt/EBITDA of 2.2x in FY10. The business was built on leverage, and we expect
the next few years to be characterised by debt pay-down. This does suggest limited
ability to invest into a market upturn when it comes
Given the lower earnings base as FY09 numbers were well below our forecasts,
and our assumption of pricing weakness continuing into FY10, we reduce our
estimates by 21% for FY10. Our estimates are based on the pre-rights issue
position, and therefore do not reflect the impact of the transaction. On proforma
post rights issue, we estimate EPS of 1.4p in FY10 and 1.5p in FY11.
According to management, FY09 consensus is c£85m EBIT vs UBSe £76m. The
key difference relates to pricing, where we assume pricing pressure continues into
FY10. Until utilisation at Northgate and across the industry is where it needs to be,
we expect competitors to price aggressively to generate cash.
Valuation: Price target cut to 60p from 110p
c50% of the reduction relates to the earnings downgrades, and c50% due to the fact
the company raised less equity than we had hoped, and is therefore more limited in
its ability to invest into the upturn. PT based on 0.6x price/book (from 0.8x).
positives showing that the story is alive and well. I agree with the shares
though, they should be down. They were unable to answer a key question on cash
and they failed to disclose openly an important aspect in the new ‘guidance’. I
still think that at 14x this is a buy and I am holding on post doubling up.
cash conversion number they were unable to provide the simply calculation that
would have demonstrated a pro-forma cash conversion number of 92-95% vs the
104% reported and the 63% suggested by the bears. This was very disappointing.
It was discussed all morning in the market and not to be able to address this
was poor. Gerardus ran through his calculation with the FD after the meeting
and he said that it looked right to him but that they would put the detail on
the website. This should be available soon!.
(!) but they numbers imply revenues of 180 and eps of 19c for Q3. This was vs
120 and 25c for consensus and therefore looks very low. The Revenues were well
explained pointing to the conservative use of normal seasonality rather than
last year’s patterns but they failed to point out in the presentation that the
reason why this drove eps of 19c not higher was thanks to a 10-15m one off cost
of marketing taken in Q3 ready for a big launch in Q4. Had this been in this
morning’s statement this would not be an issue. To not mention it might be.
was poor in terms of telling the market. Now though as the stock is in the 11s
and on 14x p/e, less than SAP, for a stock that is consistently delivering 20%
earnings growth. The story, if anything, is getting more interesting with the
new areas that they are moving into with “phase 2” and the media search
software but I hope they tell us about it better in future. I’m keeping mine.
