Markets live chat transcript for the chat ending at 12:15 on 17 Feb 2009. Participants in this chat were: Paul Murphy, FT (PM) Neil Hume, FT (NH)
Legal & General is an uncommunicative company at the best of times – but now would be a good moment to open up. The market is in a panic about rights issues, dividend cuts and credit losses.
As L&G’s shares plunged a further 10% yesterday, the historic yield hit 13%, which is the market saying it doesn’t believe the dividend payout will be maintained. The shares now trade below levels seen in the dark days of 2002 and 2003, when the FSA had to change the rules to pull the life insurance sector out of a spiral of decline caused by forced selling of equities.
The FSA is also at the centre of the current drama. It has asked the life companies to stress-test their businesses to see how they would cope with a further plunge by stock markets and a further deterioration in the market for corporate bonds. In fact, plunge is an understatement. The FSA’s most extreme test imagines a fall in the FTSE 100 index to a level of 2000, from 4135 today. If that happens, we really are in depression.
The FSA is playing a dangerous game here. Life insurers are not banks. They tend to hold assets such as corporate bonds to maturity. If they were ordered to organise their affairs to prepare for a 60% fall in stock markets, we’d have chaos. There would be a rush out of equities and corporate bonds into 30-year gilts, where the size of the market is not big enough to cope with a stampede.
It is unlikely (despite appearances) that the FSA will be that dumb. But something is clearly afoot and the market senses that L&G will be the big loser. The company is perceived as having under-provided for defaults in its corporate bond portfolio. If the FSA intends to harden the rules, investors worry that L&G will have to turn to shareholders.
L&G, sensing the market’s glare, yesterday said that “there are no conversations (with the FSA) beyond the usual year-end process.” That’s fine as far as it goes, but it’s not the same as a formal management statement on regulatory capital. Aviva and Prudential spoke last month but L&G chose not to. The current timetable imagines L&G staying silent until 25 March. We’ll see. If the shares don’t bounce soon, the company will have to swallow its pride and publish before then.
Mind you, the FSA could do everybody a favour by saying what the stress-testing exercise is meant to achieve. At the moment, it is succeeding only in spreading fear.
In the light of market speculation about the strength of Legal & General’s capital and cash positions, the Company is now issuing clarification on capital strength and reserving.
Capital Strength
As at December 31st 2008, we estimate our IGD* capital surplus was in excess of £1.6bn.
This reflects falls in equity markets to 31st December 2008, the credit default reserving detailed below, and our current view of other year-end adjustments (an assessment of which is ongoing), but is before accrual of the final dividend.
Credit Default Reserving
In 2008 Legal & General’s default experience was broadly in line with long term assumptions. However, in the light of the current economic environment, the Company believes it is appropriate to reserve on a more prudent basis. As part of its year-end process, Legal & General has therefore decided it is appropriate to take additional reserves against the anticipated risk of a short term rise in credit defaults.
The planned additional reserves, which are before tax, follow a thorough sector-by-sector review of our portfolio, and default experiences from the 1930s and subsequent recessions. On the basis of this analysis, we have decided to increase credit default assumptions for the next four years from our long term assumption of 30bps per annum for corporate bonds to approximately 130bps per annum, again before tax. This is equivalent to a further £650m (before tax) in credit default reserves, taking total reserves for defaults in our annuity portfolio to £1.2bn.
In our judgement these increased reserves are both prudent and appropriate to cover all reasonably foreseeable circumstances. We have worked closely with the Financial Services Authority and have kept them fully informed of our approach.
* EU Insurance Groups Directive. Unaudited, management estimate
• L&G has increased its provision for defaults from 30bps in perpetuity, to 130bps for the next 4 years followed by 30bps thereafter.
• This extra 4% on £18bn of reserves equates to a £650m pre tax hit and takes total reserves for defaults to £1.2bn. This would in our opinion be adequate.
• The result of this is that the year end IGD surplus is now in excess of £1.6bn, previous guidance was £2.6bn, pre dividend cost of roughly £260m so implicit in this announcement is that they plan to pay the final dividend.
• The share price moves of the last few days look excessive and could relate to a short squeeze. Expect this to unwind rapidly as shorts get taken off.
• This is also a poor showing by IR. They were aware of these criticisms in November and could have done something about this sooner.
After yesterday’s volatility, L&G has brought forward the announcement of its capital position.
The group has decided to more than quadruple its default allowance for corporate bonds from 30b.p. per annum to 130b.p., resulting in a higher than expected £650m charge, albeit some in the market were looking for larger amounts. This figure appears to have been agreed with the FSA..
Even after this, the EUIGD surplus was £1.6bn at December, considerably more than The Pru’s September figure of £1.2bn. However, the last disclosed figure for L&G was £2.9bn. Given c10% equity falls in Q4, and the £650m pretax default reserve additionm, we would have expected a December figure of c£2.1bn given the Q3 IMS sensitivities (30% equity falls = £900m lower surplus), and the £500m of further capital erosion will be a theme on the conference call.
The solvency figure is stated before dividend accrual, and although the statement is silent on dividend policy, the company is briefing that the policy is unchanged. The cost of a 4.26p final dividend is £253m, which is comfortably affordable in the context of the £1.6bn surplus.
L&G clearly does not need to raise capital at this point, and we continue to believe that the executive management of the company intend the dividend will be paid. This should at least partly allay the fears expressed by the current share price, although we would welcome further clarity on the dividend on the conference call, which commences at 7.30. (dial 01452 565 124, ID 8632 6230).
Better late than never?
L&G have responded to the pressure on its share price over the last week or
so but announcing its 2008 year end IGD surplus, and increasing the level of
prudence in its credit default reserving. The move brings it in line with others
in the sector, and the cost of achieving it at £650m pre-tax is less than had
been feared. The move should be taken well in that it has not necessitated a
capital raise, but we are less certain on the outlook for the final dividend,
which we view as highly vulnerable.
reserving position (compared to others in the sector), L&G has responded by finally
advising the market of its IGD surplus at 31 December 2008. The figure was
conspicuous by its absence in the Q4 life new business figures, compared with others in
the sector, which all gave an updated figure. The IGD surplus at 31 December is “in
excess of £1.6bn” pre-accrual of the final dividend, but after a £650m (pre-tax)
additional credit default reserving.
additional reserving. The short-term risk of a rise in credit defaults has led L&G to
increase its default assumptions for the next four years, from its previous long term
assumption of 30bp to approx 130bp per annum. This brings L&G into line with others
in the sector, that range from Prudential 80bp (our 2008 year end estimate) to 225bp at
Friends Provident.
around half (£325m) will impact the 2008 EV P&L. We will need to adjust our 2008
IFRS and EV earnings accordingly. We estimate that the impact to L&G’s Embedded
Value will be to reduce it by approx 4.0p/share. The 2008E dividend will not be covered
based on our forecasts, and we believe that the final dividend is in danger of being cut or
even passed.
the outlook for assets, additionally L&G’s valuation has been hammered by the lack of
clarity over its IGD surplus and fears of a deeply discounted rights issue and/or cuts to
its dividend, as a result of coming into line with its credit default reserving. Today’s
announcement has removed the uncertainty and we do not anticipate a capital raising
unless the FSA forces the issue with the sector. In theory, the shares should bounce in
the short term given some of the huge (£2.5bn+) estimates that some thought would be
needed to take a more cautious approach to reserving. That said, we also believe that
L&G’s final dividend is under threat given that it is not covered by IFRS profits. We
consequently maintain our Hold recommendation and 65p target price. We will review
our EPS forecasts later today to take account of the changes
increase its short term provision to 130bp for the next four years and then revert
to its long term 30bp p.a loss assumption. This should cost the company £650m.
This leaves the company with an IGD surplus at the end of the year in excess of
£1.6bn.
This is all broadly in line with our expectations – we had stress tested a move to a
uniform 100bp p.a loss assumption, which arrived at a £750m estimate. Our
estimate of the IGD surplus net of our credit reserve assumption was ballpark
£1.6bn. Overall, we think this is a sensible move, which will likely reassure the
market – the bears had been suggesting a figure of £2bn increase in reserves.
Well this might help explain.
Short selling disclosure
RNS Number : 4261N
Odey Asset Management LLP
17 February 2009
Form TR-4. FSA Version 2.0 September 2008
Disclosure of Short Position relating to UK Financial Sector Company
Full name of person(s) holding the disclosable short position:
Odey Asset Management LLP
2: Name of the issuer of the relevant securities
Legal & General Group plc
3: Disclosable short position -0.35%
4. Date that disclosable short position was held -13 February 2009
the Dawn – 27 January 2009) we estimated that Lloyds Banking Group (LBG)
could get through the economic downturn by raising as little as £3bn in equity
at 60p per share. Post the trading statement (13 February 2009) we have
revised this estimate to £11.2bn, which at 50p would dilute stressed tNAV per
share to 67p and potentially increase government ownership to 76%.
c£200m ahead of our forecast, but a loss of £8.5bn for HBOS, c£6bn worse.
This primarily reflects structured credit writedowns c£2bn higher than
expected and corporate loan impairments some £3bn higher. We believe this is
likely to reflect deteriorating credit quality rather than earlier recognition.
We expect underlying pre-tax losses of £14bn 2008-2010E — We assume
corporate credit quality continues to deteriorate in 2009, although at a slower
pace than in the latter part of 2008. We also update our margin estimates to
reflect lower interest rate expectations. The combined effect is to increase
cumulative underlying pre-tax losses 2008-2010E from £1.5bn to £14.0bn.
Downgrade to Hold (2H); TP 65p (from 120p) — Although the government’s
Asset Protection Scheme could provide relief, the scale of potential capital
issuance means the balance of risk has adversely shifted. We are cutting our
recommendation from Buy/High Risk (1H) to Hold/High Risk (2H) with a new
target price of 65p (from 120p), representing 1.0x diluted stressed tNAV per
Lloyds Banking Group (LBG) today published a trading update for the year
ended 31 Dec 2008 advising that Lloyds TSB was on course for a pre-tax
profit of £2.4bn for the year with the HBOS businesses expected to generate
a loss of £10bn. Pro-forma, therefore, the combined group would have
lost £7.6bn in the year just gone.
We believe that risk asset losses will fall for the UK banks in 2009 due to
provisions passed, assets sold and positioned reclassified to more capitalfriendly
accounting categories. However, we expect corporate loan losses
generally to worsen as the recession deepens and ages. Lloyds Banking
Group advises that HBOS’ corporate division loan losses for 2008 are expected
to reach £7bn or 599bps of average loans. The run rate of loan losses
in this division in 2008 were: 1H08 83bps, 3Q08 428bps, Oct-Nov 08
810bps, Dec 3798bps. We do not believe the December run rate of loan
losses will continue – some of the December charge is a re-provisioning of
loans to match LBG standards – but the bank concedes that loan losses for
2008 in this division will report around £1.6bn higher than LBG management
had expected in early November 2008.
LBG expects to end 2008 with pro-forma core tier 1 capital ratios of 6.0% -
6.5% and total tier 1 above 9%. Though we expect government asset
guarantees – to be finalised in late February 2009, we believe – will help
rather than harm shareholders, we believe LBG possesses too little core
capital confidently to address shareholder concerns in 2009, given the recent
performance of the acquired loan portfolio. Sell, target price 55p
UK banks, where it has 62% of its loans. We adjust our US$9bn capital
raising to US$15bn and assume dividends are cut. Operationally UK banks
are showing tremendous NPL growth and this will be new for HSBC when
it reports on 2 March. Our key earnings adjustment is for full Household
goodwill write down, but also higher provisions in 10CL, 11CL. This has a
major impact on profit but also on book value per share. Our new price
target is at 0.7x tangible book value, which puts shares on HK$41.
US and UK banking
HSBC has US$380bn of loans in the UK and US$286bn in the US, accounting
for 62% of total loans. Banks in those countries are trading at 0.2-0.5x price
to tangible book. This is partly due to goodwill, but also due to the disbelief of
asset valuations and therefore, book value. HSBC is trading on 1.0x price to
tangible book. Doing a simple weighted adjustment based on its asset
exposure, we arrive at a 0.7x price to tangible book.
As we have indicated in the past, banks in Asia have raised capital at 13% of
pre-existing shareholders’ funds, which implies US$15bn for HSBC. A 1 for 4
share offering at a 35% discount would achieve this, thereby issuing 2.9bn
new shares. The adjusted share price would be HK$56.8 from HK$61.0 today,
holding all else equal. But unlike deals done by Stanchart or DBS, we do not
believe this would well received, as funds would go for provisioning.
UK operations
NAB reported its past due and impaired loans in the UK from 99bps of loans
to 164bps of loans from Sept 2008 to Dec 2008. This 70% increase over a
single quarter is worrisome but very much in line with HBOS results. During
its Nov 2008 trading update, HBOS indicated its 1H08 LLP/loans of 0.80%
rose to 209bps by Sept 2008 and yet further to 271bps by Nov 2008. HSBC
Bank Plc (UK) has reported flat LLP for years at 45bps.
Indications from the bank’s last trading update were for a write-down on
Household goodwill, which we believe should have been done a year ago. We
now incorporate this at US$5bn this year and US$5bn next year, effectively
writing off the full amount. This causes stated PB to rise 17%, but is still
inflated with $30bn in other goodwill and undercapitalised.
put Standard Chartered in an enviable position. With gearing in corporate
Asia at just 20%, nonperforming-loan formation will be lower than in the
previous cycle. The bank’s focus on countries that will only feel the
secondary impact of the global slowdown; deeper client penetration;
enhanced product capabilities; and an upturn in Korean revenue will
protect earnings in 2009-10. The stock is cheap at less than 1x PB. BUY.
Standard Chartered (StanChart) faces limited concentration risk: Korea, Hong
Kong, Singapore, other Asia and India account for 60% of its asset base. In
these countries, we have seen little in the way of consumer leverage as in the
US, UK or Australia. At the same time, corporate gearing has fallen a long
way. This suggests that nonperforming-loan (NPL) formation will not be as
high as in recent downturns nor as high as in the US, UK or Australia.
Buying capabilities
The key to StanChart’s elevated profit growth over the past several years has
been its acquisition of companies and capabilities. This strategy has allowed
the bank to sell more products to its existing client base and to expand its
customer reach. The ability to do more with existing clients paves the way for
solid expansion and this benefit is accentuated now, as global peers are
distracted due to liquidity, capital or credit problems.
thesis regarding a possible capital increase at HSBC.
We have extended our analysis of the group capital
position and the AFS book, and provide clarification on
four issues. As a result of the additional work and
clarification, we are reducing our estimated gross capital
requirement to $20-35bn from $27-42bn. Over the last
few weeks we have become incrementally more bearish
on the outlook for profits and so continue to pencil in a
$20bn capital increase in our bear case. Stay U/W.
$5.8bn capital requirement to remove the leverage in
HSBC’s Hong Kong subsidiary. We have now learnt that
HSBC Holdings is the owner of the preference shares
and if required could exchange the preference shares
for equity. We have therefore removed this requirement.
(2) Treatment of AFS reserves: Previously we noted
that HSBC would have an estimated $15bn AFS reserve
(~130bp) added back to capital end 08e. The UK is not
unique in this treatment as this is followed in the US and
Benelux, though within our European coverage universe
the AFS contribution to capital is much greater at HSBC.
saying that HSBC needed capital to plug the $34bn FV
deficit within its US loan book, rather that investors
should not ignore it. That said, emerging legislation on
Cram downs poses a material threat to US capital, over
and above the $5bn we identified, in our view.
4) Capital at the Holding company: We estimated that
over the last 9 years HSBC carried an average of 120bp
of surplus capital at the “top”. HSBC claims that its aim is
to carry a benchmark 5% of capital centrally and this
ranges between 5% and 7%, suggesting $6-9bn at end
07. We have adjusted our analysis and extended it to
consider likely dividend distributions from subs. As a
result, we have reduced the capital earmarked to
strengthen the Holding company position by $1bn.
NH: Spice has adopted an ambitious strategy for growth and was admitted to the official list of the London Stock Exchange in July 2008, having first been admitted to AIM back in August 2004. Our underlying mission is to deliver value added services to our customers and thereby create sustainable returns for our shareholders.
We recognise that our greatest asset is our people and we actively encourage all of our staff to participate in our business both as employees and shareholders, recognising that our future depends on the quality and commitment of our people.
- Billing
- Electricity
- Energy
- Facilities
- Gas
- Telecoms
- Water
- Corporate Functions
Spice’s IMS confirms continued confidence in meeting market expectations, with some continued weakness in facilities and gas offset by strength in billing, energy and electricity. We make no change to our forecasts and reiterate our Buy recommendation.
Strength in billing, energy and electricity offsets weakness in facilities and gas
Within the group’s Supply division (billing and energy services; representing approximately one-third of group profit) trading has been strong, with the pilot imbalance project with Eon Electricity progressing well, and the group optimistic that it will be converted into a longer-term contract.
Acquisitions to remain a feature of the investment case
Following the group’s recent placing to raise c.£50m we still expect acquisitions to remain a focus for the group, although believe that a larger deal is unlikely to materialise imminently (as some have speculated). During February 2009, the group made two small acquisitions, Treewise and Stow Land Control, for a combined consideration totalling £1.6m (£0.4m of which is contingent consideration). We estimate the group has now spent c.£14.8m of the net funds raised on acquisitions, and expect full-year net debt of £100.1m, representing gearing of 52%. We note Spice’s £170m facility, which provides c.£70m headroom, is in place until March 2012.
Forecasts unchanged
We make no change to our forecasts. For the year to April 2009 we expect PBT growth of 48% to £33.0m, EPS growth of 14% to 6.6p and a DPS of 1.4p. For the year to April 2010, we expect PBT growth of 19% to £39.4m, EPS growth of 16% to 7.7p and a DPS of 1.6p.
Buy recommendation reiterated
Over the past three months, Spice’s shares have declined by 21%, which compares to the FTSE All Share up 1% and our Managed Services sub-sector up 6%. We believe Spice is a well-managed business, largely exposed to non-cyclical markets with an attractive growth outlook. The stock trades on an April 2009E P/E of 11.2x, vs. our managed service peer group 16.2x. When this is considered against compound annual forecast earnings growth of 12.7%, we believe the group’s valuation is too low. We reiterate our Buy recommendation.
H2 09 IMS: Reassuring Statement
Reassuring statement — Statement guides to ‘in-line’ – weakness in Gas and
Facilities off-set by strength elsewhere. Extensions for AT&T and National
Grid. New water imbalance contract with Thames Water.
Largely defensive… — DPCR5 is shaping up well for Electricity and EDF
(50% of sales) seems well funded. The EON contract in Billings continues to
progress well and management is optimistic about a full contract. Gas EBITA
could be £1m lower due to more competition from construction and
accounting change.
Facilities weak — Facilities remains tough with continued margin pressure.
40% of facilities relates to retail, 20% compliance and 40% insurance.
Facilities accounts for c. 5% group EBITA but less than 2.5% of our
valuation. Progress of cost reduction (target £0.75-1m annual cost savings).
acquisition is integrating well. Two small Electricity acquisitions announced.
LIBOR winner — With net debt / EBITDA below 2.5x we would expect Spice
to pay 85bp above LIBOR on its debt. Our current forecasts assume an
interest rate of 5.9%. 200bp off LIBOR would result in a 5% EPS upgrade for
FY 10E. We estimate y/e net debt of £99.7m (significant headroom vs.
£170m facility).
Hold / High Risk — Double digit growth is attractive when our top-down
estimate is for a 30% decline in market earnings. Spice is primarily exposed
to regulated utility spend which should prove defensive. Spice is trading on a
CY 09E P/E of 9.6x and an EV/EBIT of 8.1x and looks cheap relative to
peers.
The Board remains confident in the Company’s resilient business model and continues to manage the business with a prudent focus on cash and costs. Furthermore, the withdrawal of credit insurance in relation to Topps has not had an impact on the Board’s expectations for the trading performance of the business in the current financial period.
outlined by management at the time of the interims, the group is facing some challenges within its
Facilities business (c. 5% FY2009E operating profit) as a result of the weaker economic
environment. The statement notes that this ‘has weakened further since December’ and, with high
street spend not anticipated to pick up in the near term, the group has taken action to reduce its
cost base. In addition, in the division’s insurance related activities there has been some softening
in volumes as insurers have increased their proportion of cash settlements with claimants. This
deterioration is in line with both our expectations and commentary from the rest of the peer
group.
At the time of the interims, management noted that there had been some softening in the gas
market place in the South of England. However, this now appears to be affecting the group’s
operations in the North also. Management states that ‘we expect the performance of the gas
business to fall short of the Board’s expectations’ as a result of softer markets and reduced
margin expectations.
FY2009E operating profit) continues to be tough but is on track to meet expectations for FY09E.
avoid the worst effects of the macro economic downturn although the mix of the business may
change slightly. We look for PBT of £32.1m (2008A: £22.4m) and EPS of 6.9p (2008A: 5.8p) for
FY2009E. The shares have fallen back c. 28% over the last month (including this morning’s 15%
fall) and are now trading on a PER of 8.5x for CY2009E vs. the rest of our support services
coverage on 7.2x and the Facilities Management peer group on 9.3x. We are therefore upgrading
our recommendation to INLINE from Underperform.
c£18bn UK annuity book by £650m, reflecting impairments of 520bps over the
next four years, which it believes reflects a “1929″ event for this average single-A
asset portfolio. We concur with this assessment and now believe that, with an
IGD surplus greater than £1.6bn, the capital position reinforces management’s
comment that it will not have a rights issue in the short term.
conference call, we have, however, cut our final dividend by 30%. We now
believe that, given L&G’s lower valuation, a dividend announcement along these
lines is unlikely to too negatively impact the share price. However, we are also of
the view that, despite bullish comments from management, a likely rating
downgrade, pricing changes following today’s announcement and less available
capital should put the brakes on future bulk annuity sales. This is not necessarily
a bad thing for sentiment given investors’ current distaste for the geared credit
risk exposure that bulk annuities represent. Despite a very poor outlook for sales
in 2009-10, with the stock underperforming its peer group and the market by
30% and 40% since mid 2008, respectively, the stock is now trading at near an
appropriate relative value. We consequently upgrade our recommendation to
Market Perform, with an unchanged price target of 75p.
fair value of 35%, which is near the bottom of the peer group range and close to
reflecting the poor outlook for 2009, in our view. Unlike for Prudential and Aviva,
which have slightly lower valuations, we have not upgraded the stock to a buy as we
do not expect the same level of positive newsflow.
Dividend cut now in the price. We have cut our 2008E final dividend by 30% to
reflect the tightening capital situation. This represents 19% and 12% cuts to the total
dividend paid in 2008-09E, respectively. We have a 2009 dividend of 4.3p, which is
below Bloomberg consensus of 6.5p, but we believe that the latter does not reflect true
investor sentiment. KBWe 2009 dividend yield of 9.7% is also attractive.
will be injected into the annuity book is likely to push the fixed-charge cover further
into the BBB range. Given that the current financial strength rating is AA+, we think a
downgrade is likely in the short term. The group is currently on a “negative watch” at
S&P. We only expect a one-notch downgrade at this stage.
Impact on embedded value. Management stated that this would be less than the
£650mn pre-tax IFRS impact, but still material. We assume 65% of this impact for the
EEV income statement.
