Markets live chat transcript for the chat ending at 12:16 on 19 Jan 2009. Participants in this chat were: Paul Murphy, FT (PM) Neil Hume, FT (NH)
We will report good growth and continued progress on our financial goals for 2008, despite the worsening macroeconomic environment. Trading conditions were more difficult in some of our markets in the fourth quarter, but all of our businesses achieved or exceeded our guidance for 2008. We also benefited from the strength of the US dollar against sterling* and a lower tax rate.
Marjorie Scardino, chief executive, said: “We are naturally cautious about the economic environment, but we take confidence from our performance in 2008. It provides evidence that our strategy for long-term, sustainable growth is working. Some of our markets will be tough this year and we are managing the company accordingly. But that strategy, our record of investment and our resilience will enable us to take full advantage of the opportunities this environment gives us to build our business and gain share.”
We expect our effective tax rate to be around the low end of our previous guidance of 27-29%.
Looking ahead to 2009, we are planning on the basis that the worldwide economic environment will be tough and that trading conditions will continue to be challenging in some of our markets. However, we expect the company to prove durable once again thanks to the strength and breadth of our education business, Penguin’s consistent publishing performance and the FT Group’s shift towards subscription and content revenues.
As has been suggested in the press, the UK government is to provide protection
for the banks against losses in certain asset classes. The assets expected to be
covered are mortgages (both commercial and residential); structured credit; and
certain other corporate / leveraged loans. Under the scheme, the banks would
retain the first loss tranche on these loans, and losses above a certain level would
be split 90% to Her Majesty’s Treasury (HMT) and 10% to the banks. A fee will be
payable to the government, normally in the form of alternative capital instruments
issued to the government (not ordinary shares).
This proposal looks to us to be similar to agreements reached in the US. The big
benefit to the banks of such a scheme is that the risk weighting on the assets
insured drops sharply: in the US, the risk weighting fell to ~20%, thus boosting
capital ratios. The level of first loss for the banks is typically ~10% of the assets
covered. In terms of the fees for the insurance, using Citigroup as an example,
$7bn of preference shares were issued at a coupon of 8% to cover ~$300bn of
assets. We should note that the Citi scheme also involved the issue of warrants
(which HMT does not seem to be proposing). Other US government asset loss
protection schemes have incurred a fee 3.4%. We should note that the Citi
scheme involved the issue of warrants (which HMT does not seem to be
proposing). Other US government asset loss protection schemes have incurred a
fee 3.4%.
There is no indication of the size of the scheme from the government. In total, we
believe RBS, Barclays and LBG have ~£900bn exposure to CRE, residential
mortgages, and structured credit. We do not think all of this will need to utilise the
asset protection scheme. We have previously estimated that the size of a ‘bad
bank’ in the UK might need to be £100bn. We will be revisiting assumptions now
that more detail has been provided.
RBS has also put out a statement saying it is to converted £5bn of UK Govt prefs into equity (rights price 32p). RBS statement also says that the bank is to report a £7-8bn FY post tax lost. However, this is before any goodwill impairment, and the difference may account for the FT reporting a possible £20bn loss.
LLOY has also put out a statement. They have reiterated their previous guidance in November, and now expect synergies of greater than £1.5bn. No change in HBOS conditions since December. Also in the press, suggestions that UK Govt to get NRK lending again (Peston & Sunday Times). Govt to creates a £100bn insurance scheme so that structured credit assets are not going to see ballooning of capital requirements.
Valuation and Recommendation: We believe banks ex HSBC represent option value. We believe that relieving worries about structured credit asset valuation makes a rights issue by HSBC, which we thought was unlikely, even less likely. Our Rec on HSBC is BUY TP 950p.
Another bailout, another rally? Not for long
Any euphoria from the plethora of government bank support programmes
announced today will prove short-lived, we think – the further losses from the
combination of deflation and deleveraging will consume these additional
funds, leaving equity shareholders at risk of further dilution.
sector. Four of the key initiatives are: 1) a credit guarantee scheme; 2) a guarantee
scheme for asset-backed securities; 3) a £50bn BOE-administered asset purchase facility; and 4) a capital and asset protection scheme. Details are still being released, but press reports indicate that £100bn–200bn of additional government funding could be committed.
programmes could cost the government (read: taxpayers) far more than anticipated; 2)
banks could be dragged through a creeping nationalisation that severely dilutes existing shareholders; and 3) none of the above will achieve the desired result, which (we assume) is to lay a firm foundation for economic recovery.
environment quickly turned out to be better than expected. Unfortunately, things seem
to be going in the opposite direction, with asset prices in particular falling more quickly than anticipated. For the guarantee/insurance programmes, this would mean that defaults rise more quickly than expected (triggering the guarantees) and that losses would be bigger than expected (driven by the falling asset prices). This harks back to our main investment thesis for the banks: that the combination of deflation and deleveraging will drive a rise in loan defaults as well as higher losses on those loans (see our December 2008 note, “This Is A Large Crisis”).
Which brings up the key question from our point of view – why would we want to
maintain the suffocating debt levels that we have reached? In some ways, the M4 lending/ GDP levels could be looked at as national private debt versus income; for the 1960s
behaviour given the macro outlook, and (from a distinctly Austrian/Hayekian viewpoint) the sooner asset prices fall to clearing levels, the sooner we can build a robust foundation for economic recovery.
What does all this mean for the UK banks’ share prices? Although we would expect a
short-term uplift from yet another government bailout, we would also expect further
downside as further losses consume these additional funds – leaving existing
shareholders at risk of further dilution. We maintain our severely negative stance on UK banks, and our key Sells on RBS and BARC.
We would regard the indicated latest plans as positive at the margin, but not changing the key issue of the unknown and potentially unlimited losses of the banking system and therefore whether it will ultimately require further capital injections. We therefore remain negative on the domestic banks and prefer the Far Eastern names and the Swiss banks on a relative basis. We would regard any strength on the measures as a selling opportunity. The RBS statement illustrates the scale of dilution from the effects of the downturn.
RBS statement shows the effects of the downturn on credit quality and the dilution this causes. Negative read across to other names,
especially Lloyds TSB in our view.
Range of measures to support funding and increase credit flow, but with more limited dilution to shareholders at this stage and
keeping the banks as independent institutions. This is positive at the margin.
However, until the scale of ultimate credit losses is
known, we would see the risks of additional capital raising and associated dilution as on the downside, with full scale nationalisation as the likely next step if the latest initiative proves insufficient.
quoted as saying he expects bad assets to be ‘dealt with,’ ie presumably written down. Estimates for the scale of assets here range
from £100-200bn. However, what is important is not the size of the face value of the assets, but the size of the write-downs. We believe
that, for the three domestic banks alone, this could come to £30bn and we don’t think that is likely here.
to fund those write-downs are), but the likely size of credit quality problems associated with loan books; these are only just starting to go
bad and will be significantly bigger in our view. A bad bank/credit guarantees will not address that, unless they are also extended to
assets going bad in the future ie over the next few years.
BoE asset purchase facility.
While the first two measures relate to liquidity support for the banking sector, the last two measures are focused on providing implicit capital support. The purchase facility would appear to reflect some influences of the US TARP programme and may be targeted at purchasing more problematic assets such as leveraged loans and lower-rated ABS structures.
As with the original US programme, there are likely to be issues with regard to the valuation of the assets and whether these are purchased at on-market or off market levels and no details have yet been provided. The asset protection scheme also reveals some US influences in that it mirrors the role that institutions such as Freddie Mac played in the US financial sector by providing assets wraps to other financial institutions, thereby massively increasing leverage in the financial system.
The announcements today do not change our core recommendations for the UK banks, where we see increased Government sponsorship as an unequivocal positive for credit asset classes which offer limited issuer flexibility. We therefore remain Overweight Senior and Lower Tier II and see today’s measures as enhancing the credit profile of these asset classes. We remain more cautious with regard to the outlook for more deeply subordinated capital instruments such Tier I where we remain Neutral and see increased Government intervention as adding an extra layer of uncertainty with regard to coupon deferral outcomes. Quite simply, in the event of large absolute losses for the sector, potentially there may be a move towards greater sharing of these losses across the whole capital structure, which would be negative for deeply subordinated credit investors.
In the longer term, the Government and the FSA believe that it would be preferable for the capital regime to incorporate counter cyclical measures which lead to banks building up buffers in good years which they can draw down during economic downturns, and the FSA and the Bank will be strongly supporting the work by the Financial Stability Forum and Basel Committee in this area.
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/Statements/2009/bank_capital_.shtml
This follows the publication by them of false claims that he wants to sell his interest in Chelsea FC. Mr Abramovich has already made quite clear, through the directors of Chelsea, that he has no intention of doing so and that neither he nor any of his appointed representatives has been pursuing any such course of action.
Representatives of the oligarch have travelled to Saudi Arabia and Dubai to elicit interest in the club, Gulf sources have told The Sunday Times.
At least one of the meetings was with members of the Saudi royal family. There has been no evidence so far of a potential buyer.
He was previously corporate manager for the Alsa Group from 1995, becoming chairman in 1999.
National Express (NEX) faces the prospect of a downturn at its rail business. The
subsidy profile at East Anglia is not onerous but still requires growth, so we think
profits will be impacted, albeit not by as much as elsewhere. The major concerns
surround East Coast, where revenue growth of c10% is required. We are more
positive than some for long distance given the ability to yield-manage (which is not
the case for commuter rail). Therefore, the downturn appears to be more than
factored in now.
Along with rail, the market is still struggling to understand the Spanish operation
(even though the company has spent a lot of time attempting to explain it).
Although we believe in the quality of this business, we also believe fares are
unlikely to rise significantly in 2009 given the emergency fare rise in 2008 to cover
increased fuel costs (which, of course are now lower). However, sterling-reported
profits should still be up in 2009 due to translation.
The biggest issue impacting NEX is re-financing, with €540m of debt falling due
in February 2010. The problem we have is that in normal circumstances this would
not be an issue, with NEX perhaps paying a higher rate to renew facilities.
However, in the current circumstances we do not know what will happen. At the
very least we believe it is unrealistic to believe the company will grow its dividend
by 10%, as previously stated.
Valuation: SOTP-based price target moves from 700p to 500p
We retain our Neutral rating. Although our SOTP analysis puts NEX’s intrinsic
fair value at 576p, we apply a 15% discount to reflect refinancing risk, leading to
our new 500p price target (see Appendix, page 28).
issuing a statement saying that a) PBT should be ‘well ahead’ of consensus of
£5.3bn (ML(e) £4.6bn) and b) the core tier 1 ratio (on the co. basis) will be ~6.5%.
We were surprised that the strong profit performance has not translated into
better capital ratios. Barclays has produced 2H08 PBT of >£2.5bn, but seen
110bps of core tier 1 ratio deterioration. We think the primary cause of this was
faster RWA growth than expected: assuming a profit of £5.8bn for the year would
imply RWAs of ~£445bn, versus £353bn at 1H08 and ML(e) £387bn at year end.
We believe this was due to a combination of currency moves (RWAs in USD and
EUR) and Basel 2 procyclicality.
deductions, which we prefer to ignore, giving a year end core tier 1 ratio of ~6.2%
on our basis. Given the capital position of European peer group banks (sector
average 7.2%), we think that Barclays’ relative position looks less comfortable
than before this announcement. In addition, any further GBP weakness could
cause capital ratios to suffer further, owing to the lack of hedging in the capital
base.
concerns down. A possible future shortage of capital following further
asset deterioration could eventually push the bank into the arms of the
government if existing shareholders are unwilling or unable to provide yet
further support and share price weakness persists. The support terms
offered by the UK government may not be as favourable as given to its
domestic peers. We reiterate our Underweight recommendation on
Barclays. Barclays 5yr senior CDS is currently trading at 155/175bps.
in an environment where many major competitors report multi-billion losses.
However, we doubt whether this pre-announcement of the results that are to be
fully disclosed on 17 February is sufficient to calm down investor fears and
prevent the share price from dropping even further. Ongoing share price
weakness could trigger a self-fulling prophecy whereby the decreasing ability to
recapitalise the bank in the market and any subsequent negative rating actions
could ultimately trigger government intervention.
concerns about FY08 results after the horrifying 4Q08 results reported by US
peers, and about Barclays’ ability to withstand quickly deteriorating
macroeconomic market conditions. The risk that Barclays eventually may have
to turn to the government for capital injections triggers the concern that Barclays’
support terms could be less favourable and may ultimately lead to full
nationalisation and leave shareholders empty handed. Also, we suspect existing
shareholders to be reluctant to support the group after the most recent
recapitalisation effort, uncertainty about how much capital is ulitimately needed,
and heavily incurred investment losses on existing Barclays exposure.The ability
to short sell stocks again in the UK may have exacerbated to drop in the share
price.
Profit before tax “well ahead” of consensus of £5,300m
Equity tier 1 of approximately 6.5% including the benefit of the Mandatorily Convertible Notes
(MCN)
We expect that the statement will eradicate the wilder speculation that hurt the share price late on Friday. Though the revised capital ratios will feed the anticipation of another round of government
intervention, a growing probability for all the domestic banks, the operating performance at Barclays continues to compare favourably against its peers in our view.
More importantly we have lowered our equity tier 1 and tier 1 ratios by 90bp and 130bp respectively. The main driver of the reduction in the capital ratios is currency translation. We estimate that year end exchange rates caused a 13% increase in risk weighted assets.
Since we struck our estimates, the fiveyear credit default swaps of Barclays widened out to end the year at 159bp compared to 112bp at 31 October. We estimate that this generated a fair value gain on own debt of £0.3bn.
A number of banks have reported worse than expected results from investment banking for the final quarter of 2008. There were a high number of lower credit ratings against a background of a general marked weakening of credit conditions. While we have yet to see all banks report, it appears that Barclays Capital will once again have performed at least as well as the industry.
expect that Barclays Capital was profitable in 2008 (c. £1.5bn including £1.2bn fair value gains on own debt and £5bn credit writedowns).
At the time of the trading statement on 31 October Barclays expected the equity tier 1 ratio “to be broadly in line” with the 30 June 2008 proforma ratio of 6.3%. The guidance was prior to the benefit of the £3.75bn MCNs which we estimate add c. 90bp.
HSBC has long been one of the world’s most strongly capitalised banks and is committed to maintaining this position.
The company is one of dozens of quoted groups that are preparing to raise hundreds of millions of pounds in the coming weeks to reduce ballooning corporate borrowings.
Chip Hornsby, chief executive of the £2.2 billion company, has been in talks with investors. He is also negotiating with private-equity groups about raising additional capital in a private placement. A final decision on how much is required and whether to proceed will be made in the next three weeks at the end of its financial half-year.
Wolseley runs an international network of 5,000 branches in 27 countries, including the Plumb Center chain in Britain. Its debts have soared to £2.7 billion due to currency fluctuations. In recent months, the company has drastically scaled back its US arm, laid off more than 5,300 workers and reported a 50% drop in its most recent quarterly profits.
Expected market reaction – the amount speculated is not enough to get out of the woods definitively, in terms of getting away from covenants AND giving co enough balance sheet to become acquisitive again – so the re-rating you would get on an issue may not be as big as you would see with a bigger issue (at least £600m) – full recovery PER is around 16x, and this size of issue may only get you to 12-13x – which implies a share price of 360p-370p
- I’d expect to see shares drift from here (345p) towards 300p ahead of trading update next week, but 300p would be a good buying level again
They’ve now hit the press
• Management has done everything it can to avoid this scenario – brutal restructuring,
dividend cuts, capex reined in. If a rights issue is required trading conditions must have
lurched downwards yet again (weak sterling doesn’t help either)
• £400m is the figure being bandied around – that’s unlikely to be enough to ensure
covenants are banished as an issue as we enter the most difficult trading environment in
the company’s history – we’d expect the figure to be higher in order to ensure no
embarrassing second bite at the cherry is required
simply own shares – more likely may be sale of a business (Stock? North America?)
• Go early, go large is the mantra and the fact that Wolseley’s covenant test is at the end
of this month may necessitate it being first out of the blocks…
• Trading update next Monday and interims due 23rd March.
raising £300-£500m in new funds. The paper reports that the co. will make
a final decision on how much to raise at the end of its financial half year (end
Jan). This suggests to us that there has been a further deterioration in trading
and that the company is getting closer to its debt covenants. We recently
downgraded our forecasts and modelled a peak net debt/EBITDA of 3.9x vs
the covenants at 3.5x. Using an arbitrary -20% discount on new equity then
it implies16% to 27% new shares and -8% to -12% EPS dilution. The peak
Net Debt/EBITDA would fall to between 3.3x and 3.0x vs the 3.5x covenant.
Given the level of risk on the earnings number, this suggests to us that the
£300m to £500m level might actually be too low.
EBITDA down to 2.5x would in our opinion require an £800m rights issue
which at a -20% discount we believe would be -16% dilutive. At Friday’s
close, on our current forecasts Wolseley traded on 13.0x calendarised floor
09e earnings. At a 20% discount a £300m to £500m capital raising would
imply 14.1 to 14.7x adjusted floor earnings. Whilst we believe the market
would be happy to pay a higher multiple on floor earnings if the balance
sheet was fully repaired (i.e. net debt/EBITDA of 2.5x), we are not sure that
the balance sheet risk would completely disappear with a £300m to £500m
raising and downside risk to our EBITA forecasts is of course not eliminated.
That said we expect there will be many that will want to participate given
the “first in, first out” possibility that surrounds Wolseley,although we caution
that the upside from the level at which new capital might be raised may
be limited, especially vs Friday’s close. Expect negative reaction this morning
RBS’s 1H08 attributable loss was £761m so 2H08 (especially Q4) were responsible. The retail and commercial banks appear to be trading reasonably steadily (albeit in the face of a global recession) though this is more than offset by the markets businesses and credit market write-downs. With the industry now bringing asset marks further down, we feel Barclays’ level of write-downs likely to increase materially and retain our SELL call on Barclays. RBS is also looking at £10-15bn of goodwill writedowns on ABN; happily, these have no cash or regulatory capital effects.
The government pref capital is being refinanced in exchange for £5bn of equity via open offer, underwritten by the UK government. The offer is at 31.75p (less than half the 65.5p price of the last injection). It will take equity Tier 1 capital from c.7% to c.8%, we estimate. Barclays remains at 7.2% and Lloyds Banking is on 6.5% albeit including our £13.5bn estimated write-downs on fair value accounting the HBoS balance sheet.
RBS’s tangible book value will fall from 90p to 73p per share on this capital action, we estimate. However, the £600m of preference dividend will no longer be paid, improved cashflow to equity. The P/BV inflates from 0.39x to 0.47x (BARC: 0.53x, LLOY: 0.54x) leaving RBS appearing cheap (and heavily written-down already) though the high level of government ownership and involvement mean this stock is the “restructuring/recovery option” in the sector and we cannot be more excited than a HOLD call.
“New Lloyds” shows an equity Tier 1 ratio of 6.5% albeit this includes materially more write-downs (via acquisition accounting) than the peers. That said, the risk of further capital injections into the sector cannot be discounted. Assuming similar treatments, we could estimate an issue price of c.90p, raising the equity Tier 1 ratio to 7.4% and deflating the tangible BVps from 182p to 158p, leaving Lloyds on 0.62x tangible-and-recapitalised book value. We are HOLDers of Lloyds but remain cautious that further injections cannot be ruled out.
¦ Barclays not yet discounting more capital
We remain SELLers – the risk is that its level of conservatism toward write-downs has not been high enough. Today’s RBS outlook statement includes the phrase “more… credit losses seem certain”. Barclays is reasonably well capitalised (6.5-7% ET1 on today’s statement) though other banks have shown how fast this can be eroded. Finally, we would caution that government capital injections are becoming more expensive through time and that Barclays’ delay in raising capital could cost it dearly.
the extent to which losses are now expanding from within credit markets
to the rest of the balance sheet. RBS said that a series of things that
happened in Q4 that they hope will be a off thing – eg Iceland,
Madoff…. Government support for economies, asset buying should gain
traction so some “left field” items should reduce in their magnitude and
occurrence. Admits it doubled up (in corporate loans) at the wrong time
with ABN purchase.
number of factors, including losses on disposals, additional reserves
against counterparty risks/mkt spreads, losses in equity business,
principal strategy positions, correlation trading activities, carrying
value of assets in trading portfolio.
RBS to possibly around 70%. RBS responded that it thinks it appropriate
that the market is now focusing on core tier 1 – this is crucial and is
a penny that has yet to drop fully, particularly in the US. RBS says its
goal to be standalone with no govt involvement but at the moment they
have no hang ups over any particular percentage of any of its
shareholders.
it had “Absolutely no clue”.
Hester said that the negative surprise when joining RBS is that some of
the risk concentrations are inappropriate and RBS has to work its way
through that.
Asked how many single name exposures of similar/greater size to
Lyondell Chemical there were. RBS said that this is one of the issues
for more disclosures at year end – there are is not a vast number of
this scale (and credit stress) but there are not none either.
anything about Citizens.
here but hopefully not to 4%.
said it was not aware of any technical risks. Nationalisation has been
discussed with the govt but only in the sense that the govt has made it
clear it would prefer not to nationalise RBS.
writedowns.
