Markets live chat transcript for the chat ending at 12:15 on 10 Dec 2008. Participants in this chat were: Neil Hume, FT (NH) Bryce Elder, FT (BE)
years then yields would have to fall into negative territory.
However overpriced risk assets were relative to their long-term averages at the time, we couldn’t have imagined that 3 years later we would be reporting on actual negative Treasury yields.
yield yesterday for the first time. This follows Monday’s auction where 3-month bills
were sold at a discount rate of just 0.005%, the lowest level since the Treasury started
auctioning them in 1929. In addition yesterday also saw 4-week Treasury bills
auctioned with a 0% discount and given that these securities have only been
auctioned since 2001 it is no surprise that this represents the lowest level they have
been sold at.
although they still remain above last Thursday’s historic lows. It certainly seems clear
that the flight to quality trade still has some legs as investors still appear happy to park
their funds in safe havens as we close in on the end of the year despite the fact that
we’ve recently seen a healthy equity market rebound and that they provide little in the
way of value.
At the risk of sounding like somewhat of a broken record we again
highlight from our more recent version of “100 years of corporate bond returns” that
the last time Treasury yields were at or close to current levels (1940s and 1950s) we
saw four successive decades of negative real returns for Treasuries.
disinflationary trend in China, the NIESR’s suggestion that UK Q4 GDP will
contract by more than 1.0% q/q and the fact that 3-month US T-Bill rates
traded at zero, even negative yields gives plenty for idle market minds to
contemplate, and highlights the level of apoplectic fear that is gripping
some investors. In that view we would be keen to re-emphasize the following
points on the current government bond rally.
seen in government bonds via way of the deluge of totally dire economic data
from around the globe, which in turn is driving expectations of rates being
slashed to near zero in many G7 countries. Throw in a hefty measure of
associated concerns about deflation, and government bonds are in the middle
of “a perfect storm”.
other critical factors:
sharp flattening of the US Treasury curve, as short position hedges against
Agency/MBS holdings were unwound.
hefty switching out of normal governments into these quasi govt bonds
though no officials have really bothered to term it as such, but if one
argues that quantitative easing (be it implicit, e.g. current US policy, or
explicit, e.g. Japan in the early part of the decade) as being measures that
involve the outright purchase of assets shares, bonds, etc. as opposed to
repo-ing of assets, then it is difficult to deny that quantitative easing is
in process.
well as all the rate cutting, credit availability does not appear to have
improved, and it does appear that we are entering or more likely are already
in a liquidity trap (i.e. banks are unwilling to lend, so the central bank’s
newly-created liquidity is “trapped” behind unwilling lenders).
creating colossal anomalies, e.g. the collapse last week in EUR 50 yr swap
rates, attributed variously to the fear that a 2y/30y EUR Swap spread at
flat could trigger another round of swap receiving, whilst one has to give
much credence to the idea that gamma hedging from exotic desks drove the
move as well, e.g. CMS structures and receiver swaptions due for expiry soon
forcing the writers of these structures / swaptions to buy long-dated
Treasuries.
bonds, and these offer some strong suggestions that parking money in T-Bills
for no yield is not a ‘mattress money’ strategy, but one that is fraught
with a number of risks.
the G7 countries have got close to zero, there will be few if any incentives
to chase microscopic yields, even if risk appetite and bank balance sheets
remain impaired.
b) Ratings downgrade risk: this applies most obviously to the very
over-borrowed UK and US governments, with what would be some nasty potential
knock-on effects on to government guaranteed bank debt.
stimulus packages around the globe exponentially raises the risk of policy
errors, with one error compounded by the next, and the possibility that any
short-term disinflation will be followed a protracted period of inflation.
Bubble”:
“Would it matter if an asset price bubble developed in the Treasuries
market? When the Fed stoked the equity market in the wake of LTCM, the
result was a serious misallocation of capital, with funds flowing
indiscriminately into commercially unsound ‘dotcom’ ventures. The distress
and economic dislocation that followed the bursting of the housing bubble
are plainly evident. By contrast, a Treasuries bubble might, at first
glance, seem wholly benign. It simply reduces the cost to the taxpayer of
the borrowing the US Treasury is undertaking in order to pay for relief
measures in the financial sector and for fiscal stimuli to the economy. It
would not necessarily distort the allocation of capital.
- Vague answers on Rights Issue, but said ‘for now, they are capital adequate.
- No answers on disposals, and little guidance for any optimism. – Management response and confidence were poor to say the least. – Immediately, the large houses are glossing over and said it went okay, but they just want the corporate fees, the Australian press tomorow will destroy them….BEWARE.
to be honest. Albanese refused to answer most questions:
A. We can’t be specific but we take what we wrote in the statement very
seriously.
Q. Well have you had talks?
A. Yes preliminary ones.
Q. Can you meet debt targets without asset sales?
A. We are comfortable with our financial position
Q. How deep is the pool of buyers for assets?
A. There is a pool of those who are attracted to high quality assets.
Not spoken to BHP about buying assets.
Q. Can you give us geographical break down of job cuts?
A. No
Q. Rights issue plans?
A. Lots of talking but key sentences were “circumstances within our
control” and “no current plans”.
Q. Do you have support of the board
A. Yes
when asked how investors can trust these figures.
end 2009. In their first detailed communication to the market since the
termination of the BHP Billiton bid, Rio Tinto have announced plans to reduce
their net debt by US$10 billion by end 2009 from current levels (end October) of
US$38.9 billion. In terms of net debt reduction per share this is almost £5/share,
i.e. about 40% of the current share price. We believe that the market will perceive
the announced plan as credible.
Debt reduction plan in brief
The debt reduction is to be achieved through means we have previously
discussed: Reducing capex from US$9 billion to US$4 billion; Reduce
controllable operating costs by at least US$2.5 billion per year in 2010. Reduction
in global headcount of 14,000 roles (8500 contractor, 5500 employee). Dividends
to be held at 2007 levels of USc136 – no 20 percent uplift in 2008 and 2009.
Expanded scope of assets targeted for divestment including significant assets not
previously highlighted for sale. We believe this is likely to be either Coal and
Allied (Australian coal) or ERA (Uranium) but don’t rule out a potential sale of the
Grasberg stake to the Chinese or an equity investment into Iron Ore.
Since BHP’s offer for Rio Tinto was withdrawn, BHP is up 18%, Rio Tinto is down
49% i.e. 57% relative underperformance. We still don’t rule out an eventual rights
issue but believe that investors should / would be happy to subscribe to deeply
undervalued equity in what in the end, we see as largely a quality set of assets
The announcement is more comprehensive than the capex plan expected by
the market, detailing $5bn of capex cuts in 09 as well as cost cutting ($2.5bn
from 2010) and some production guidance. Divi to be held at 2007 levels (a
relief) and scope of asset sales to be broadened. Overall commitment is for
net debt to fall by $10bn in 2009 from current level of $38.9bn.
Capex reduction in 2009 from $9bn to $4bn implies only $2bn of growth capex
being executed in 2009. 2010 capex to be even lower at sustaining levels in the
absence of a recovery in markets.
Operating cost reduction plan of $2.5bn by 2010 led by 14,000 job cuts (vs
current 97,000 employees or c.50,000 ex the packaging and engineering
products businesses of Alcan). Such a big cull a very big event for conservative
RIO. Other savings from consolidation of HQs and slower exploration spend. FX
effects on lower costs highlighted – they say since Jul 1 FX moves have offset
half of the fall in commodity prices.
Divi held at 136c (7.3% yield) so the feared cut and/or the equity issue did not
materialise. This $1.6bn pa will be funded by cost cutting, so debt reduction left
to disposals and FCF generation.
Net debt in line at $38.9bn – no changes to sub 3% terms. Highlighted
current cost of debt is sub 3% (so v efficient to hold it) and it ticks only a little on a
ratings downgrade.
Increased scope to disposals: Minerals, US coal and and ali sales still “in
process” with new disposal candidates added to the list.
Pension Fund has $1bn unfunded liability (in line)
Production guidance should give comfort on iron ore in particular. RIO
reiterate FY2008 guidance for iron ore and suggest 2009E sales of 200mt (in line
with 2008 and our new assumptions). Ali to be 5% down YoY.
Rio Tinto has continued to underperform BHPB and its more financially secure peers
in the run up to this announcement despite some recent evidence of Chinese destocking coming to an end and a mild improvement in spot steel and iron ore prices.
Although the company has yet to deliver on its promises laid out today, the 7.3%
yield and PER of 3.3x should surely be enough to get investors back into the stock.
Though it is terrifically difficult to call, we have a positive view on this cycle and are
tentative buyers of both the sector and the leveraged plays which have failed to
participate in this recent rally
last week’s event and there are suggestions of severe overstocking following a poor
November.
In a worrying change of strategy M&S is set to move to full scale discounting (20 to 30%
off) across a number of product categories in the run into Christmas
were failing to excite an increasingly cautious consumer
On the food side we suspect even the very low margin ‘Dine in for £10′ has failed to halt
the loss of market share on the food side of the business
As a result, we are taking our gross margins down by 60bps in the general merchandise
business and 70bps in food to reflect what we believe is now a serious stock overhang
The effect is to take £50m off pre tax forecast to March 2009 to £590 and £40m off March
2010 forecasts to £530m, on 9.2x reduced 2009 eps, we reiterate our SELL
many years. Deloitte’s Retail Survey, BRC and John
Lewis sales trends all suggest that Christmas retail sales
will contract compared with last year’s record level. We
forecast that total (not LfL) retail sales as reported by the
BRC will fall by 1% in December. However, we expect
inflation-buoyed food sales (+5.0%) to be masking very
weak non-food performance (-6.7%).
retailers have entered the crucial Christmas selling
period with too much stock. Most retailers will have
been ordering their Christmas stock since July, two
months before consumer expenditure turned down
sharply following the HBOS and Lehman Brothers crises.
As a result, we believe that profitability will come under
significant pressure from both lower sales and higher
discounting – a dangerous combination when coupled
with 2-3% cost inflation.
most likely to disappoint. We believe that those
retailers most at risk are those who expect a second half
improvement in performance due to a softer comp base
and those exposed to big-ticket discretionary items such
as electricals.
Although we continue to believe that HMV faces severe
structural problems, its competitive position has been
strengthened by the collapse of Woolworths and supply
problems at Zavvi. As the highest-quality mainstream
supermarket, we believe that Sainsbury will benefit from
consumers trading down from M&S and Waitrose, but
still wanting to celebrate Christmas with ‘quality food’.
to play retail from a top-down perspective, we
recommend a cautious position in General Retail in early
January with a view to rebalancing on any over-reaction
to negative trading statements. However, on a
12-month view, we believe that both food retailers (price
deflation) and general retailers (overcapacity) face
significant problems, which may still not be fully reflected
in share prices.
Step 1: Strategic disposal of Swedish warehouse (£50m) reduces debt and interest payments.
Step 2: Disposal of Italian operation, improves covenant ratios.
Step 3: Cash efficiencies (£30m) and focus on debtors, potential to improve cash availability.
Step 4: Store refit uplifts (c.20%) highlight strongoperational potential.
Step 5: £75m cost removal, potential for further savings.
incrementally negative points. 1. US retailers are reducing inventories more rapidly
than anticpated underscoring the impact of the weaker US (read UK) consumer. 2.
An increasing polarisation to top-10 games titles risks ceding some of the
“specialist” competitive advantage vs supermarkets. 3. A global shift to on-line
game play would threaten to dis-intermediate retailers. While the last two points are
slow-burn (witness HMV), the portents are not positive.
numbers by 10% for Jan-09 to reflect a weaker Christmas, and by 20% for Jan-10 in
anticipation of negative LFLs. Trading on 7x Jan-10 EPS, with earnings risk to the
downside, we remain on the sidelines. HOLD.
n EA warning: Electronic Arts, the publisher of titles such as FIFA Soccer, Rock Band
and Madden NFL, warned after hours in the US, withdrawing guidance. While we
believe this is not the first time that EA has lowered expectations, and that the warning
may reflect the relative weakness of its line-up, aspects of its commentary and call can
be read-across to GMG and other industry particpants.
deceleration in LFLs as we approach the festive season. While admittedly reflecting the
weakness of the US consumer, EA’s comments on a lower inventory build, and
therefore lower retail sales expectations, have resonance in the UK. We now expect
1% 2H LFLs (FY 8%) as the tighter retail environment adds to the impact of the 3G
console cycle.
exit rates for FY Jan-09 we now factor in -7.5% LFLs for Jan-10 (mid-range for 5 to
10% down), partially offset by a stronger gross margin from a higher proportion of
software in the sales mix.
n Shift to Top-10 and on-line represent emerging risks : EA cited a flight by
consumers to Top-10 titles and away from its ‘catalogue’ as a contributing factor. While
this primarily reflects the strength of its roster, such a trend would also begin to erode
the competitive advantage of retail specialists (vs supermarkets) in stocking a broad
range. EA’s conference call Q&A also highlighted an “ongoing (global) shift to online
game play” which if sustained could threaten to dis-intermediate retailers from
segments of the market. Our new target price is 135p.
Lenders want more than a rate adjustment to provide a lifeline –
they want participation. But a complex debt structure means a
complex swap. Assessing the remnant valuation post-swap is
difficult as the two key variables (amount swapped and strike
price) fall within a wide range. However, destruction of value has
already been so great that the NAV in most debt swap scenarios
is well above the current price. For those with enough appetite
for risk, the return on TW as a warrant could be considerable.
We move from Hold to BUY; with a 24p share price target.
demand repayments of the £1.6bn on the breach, the game is up – if the USPP
debt holders call their loans, TW does not readily have the £380m required. The
only option would be to render up the entire company to the lenders. This recalls
Marconi in 2002, when the board handed over 99.5% of the equity. However, we
think the banks want to avoid having a mass of housing assets on their balance
sheets, and the pension scheme deficit potentially undermines their position.
value is £3.9bn. With £700m of debt swapped and a further £1bn written off land,
the net asset value could be as high as £2bn. The per-share division of this ranges
widely, but with the share price having fallen so far already, most of the post-swap
valuation scenarios deliver an NAV per share materially above the current share
price level. Our base case NAV is 24p fully discounted, and this sets our share
price target.
Large swap, high dilution. If TW pre-emptively offers up a large amount of equity,
dilution could be lessened. By negotiation, the lenders might be persuaded to take
equity at the prevailing market price or even a small premium, appreciating the
unwinding effect on the share price of eliminating a large part of the debt. In this
note, we run scenarios on the impact of a larger swap, concluding that for a wellstruck
deal, the remnant NAV should be twice the current share price.
Smaller swap, pricier debt. Recent press speculation has suggested that the
banks will take a smaller stake (<10%) as part of a package focused on re-pricing
the debt plus fees and charges to waive covenants. The margin on the debt is likely
to be at least 500bp (and perhaps as much as 1000bp) over LIBOR, plus fees that
could easily run to 250bp. It is hard to see a small stake sufficing, unless it is the
initial slice of a later and much larger participation. The uncertainty on ultimate
dilution would make valuation difficult (if not impossible) in this case.
expectations for the UK commercial property
market on negative equity on UK commercial
property loans
equity on property loans that were extended at the peak
of the commercial property boom (see Waiting for the
big recapitalisation trade, 20th August 2008). Since then,
expectations for falls in commercial property values in
the UK have increased significantly, so we have re-run
our analysis.
deterioration in the total return swap market’s
expectations for falls in the value of UK commercial
property to the end of 2009, shows an increase in total
negative equity from £13 billion to £41 billion, and an
increase in the amount of negative equity at risk from the
need to refinance rising sharply from £2.6 billion to £8.2
billion (see Exhibit 1).
expectations for capital growth in 2010 have turned
negative, increasing the total expected downside in
capital values, and extending the period over which we
have to consider the impact of debt refinancings by a
year. Consequently, we have extended our modelling
period to end-2010 (see Exhibit 2). This results in an
increase in the negative equity by the end of the period
to £54 billion, and essentially a doubling of the amount of
negative equity that is vulnerable owing to debt
refinancings to £16 billion.
entrance hall, carpeting throughout, 24-hour portage, and an enormous sign
on the roof, saying ‘this is a large crisis’”. -
will lead to a deadly spiral of falling prices, bad debts, credit contraction and
bankruptcies that will take years to play out. Banks’ shareholders will bear
the brunt of the pain; big Keynesian bailouts will only deepen and prolong
this crisis, in our view.
lending/GDP ratio have more than doubled. In the current environment, we expect that both lenders and borrowers – being only sensible – will reverse this trend, with banks tightening their lending criteria even further, and borrowers paying down their debts first and thinking about consumption and investment later. Expected result: stagnant top lines and falling asset prices.
prolong the crisis, by sending conflicting signals to consumers, savers and investors.
Thus, instead of a recovery for the UK economy (and its banks) in 2009, we expect the opposite: further economic contraction and a further rise in bad debts and bankruptcies.
HSBC and STAN), and we have cut most of our price targets again. We maintain our
Sell recommendations on all the UK banks except for LLOY-HBOS, which we have
downgraded to Hold on our top-down view.
At this stage of 2007, the spread of Libor (the London interbank offered rate – we use the main 3-month metric) over base moved aggressively wider as banks “dressed” balance sheets for the year-end. The spread subsequently recovered through late-December and moved close to zero in 1Q08. However, this was simply a pull-forward effect in the general ongoing widening trend. This year, concerted central bank liquidity provisions across the OECD, as well as
In aggregate, the sector has declined broadly in line with the widening of the Libor-base spread. The correlation broke down this time last year as the market looked-through the pull-forward effect of banks dressing balance sheets for year-end. The correlation has again broken down but in the opposite direction – the spread has narrowed even as the banks have fallen.
We feel this breakdown is driven by the fact that the sector has been going through the painful process of recapitalisation. Barclays and RBS have now completed that process. The HBoS and Lloyds TSB recapitalisations are broadly synchronised with the delisting of HBoS, both occurring in the week commencing 12-Jan-09. In short, the process will be completed for all the banks in the next month.
Even if the Libor-base spread does not continue to narrow (though we would obviously hope it does), we feel that the bank sector’s correlation with this spread is well founded in the fundamentals of their business models. Once the indigestion of recapitalisations pass, we can see the sector moving back up to re-assert the correlation. The sector certainly has much pain yet to bear from the impending recession and rapid NPL formation but we can foresee a short-term trading opportunity over the coming weeks.
Aside from the simple loan-deposit analysis and its linkage to the Libor-base spread, the measured correlation of stock prices with this spread show HBoS (Trading Buy, target price: 131p) as best-correlated followed by RBS (Trading Buy, TP 87p), Lloyds TSB (Hold, TP 217p) then Barclays (Sell, TP 172p) well behind. On this basis, we can see the reversion trade being led by RBS (which has completed its recapitalisation) and HBoS (which remains a cheap way into Lloyds TSB). We would be Trading Buyers of both stocks.
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