Markets live chat transcript for the chat ending at 12:05 on 25 Sep 2008. Participants in this chat were: Paul Murphy (PM) Neil Hume (NH)
Administration’s TARP grind on.
Certainly systemic risks are extremely high, and the outlook appears bleak. Spot and forward LIBOR-OAS spreads
are at all-time wides; Bank CDS premia have reached new highs; and term lending markets appear almost to have
closed, while cash hoarding continues, with Fed Funds and overnight sterling trading down as far as they can (0%
and 4% respectively), despite the large pick-ups on offer for term lending.
How can things get better from here? The experience of March-April has some instructive parallels (albeit at less
extreme levels).
In March, around the Bear Stearns debacle, money markets exhibited several of the features present today. The
spread between overnight and 3-month money went negative; and CDS pushed to new highs, taking LIBOR-OIS
spreads to new highs. Overnight CP issuance rose, and 3-month issuance fell.
But government stepped in to take control of Bear’s bad assets, and to support the provision of stronger balance
sheet backing for its counterparty obligations (via its takeover by a large commercial bank). At the same time, the
Fed pumped liquidity into financial markets, introducing the PDCF and TSLF.
In the ensuing weeks, average bank CDS rates fell back, and LIBOR-OIS spreads stabilised and subsequently
narrowed. This, and the return to a positive spread between overnight and 3-month interbank rates, saw term
issuance recover relative to overnight volumes (Exhibits A, B, C).
Certainly there are several similarities. The Fed has again extended the provision of liquidity, both by increasing its FX swap lines and by extending access to Fed financing to a broader range of counterparties and versus a wider range of collateral. The Administration has proposed a facility (the TARP) for taking illiquid assets out of the banking system – a proposal which our US colleagues believe is likely to be enacted in some form. And US financials are gaining incremental capital.
But isn’t the situation now worse than in August? We cannot deny that CDS and LIBOR-OIS spreads are significantly wider than they were in March – and therefore the situation looks now more dangerous than it did then – but it’s equally true that back in March these same spreads were much wider than the peaks seen prior to that point. Indeed in percentage terms, the widening from the prior peaks seen in March were considerably more than they have been this time around, for whatever that’s worth. That said, the collapse in CP issuance this time around is certainly more severe than it was in March.
Progress has already been made. The Central Banks’ liquidity injections have already pulled down overnight rates so that the overnight-to-3-month LIBOR curve is positive again (especially with US and UK overnights trading well below official target rates).
While the PSB report looks supportive for ITV we retain a cautious near term view on the shares ahead of expected worsening advertising newsflow over the coming months. Longer term investors prepared to look at the EPS progression through the cycle are, however, still likely to see material upside in our view. In addition we would not rule out M&A upside given the interest in BSkyB’s stake from strategic buyers.
Our forecasts already include £40m of savings in regional news programming from 2009E as well as reducing licence costs from the £44m level in 2007 which together limits the estimated PSB opportunity to more like £50-60m in our view. At this stage we have not included any of this potential further benefit in our forecasts given the uncertainty of the timing and phasing of any impact.
to go ahead with cuts to regional news services, which form part of ITV’s
Public Sector Broadcasting (PSB) requirements and which could save up to
£40m per annum, despite opposition from trade unions.
It is also expected to present new research pressing for a re-distribution of public
funding to commercial broadcasters for their PSB requirements, including “topslicing”
part of the licence fee to give to other broadcasters.
possibility lies in the likely election of the Conservatives in 1H 2010, whose policy on
broadcasting suggest that they would support significant de-regulation in ITV’s PSB
requirements aligned with an increase in the regulations for the BBC and (to a lesser
extent) Channel 4, which would help ITV’s programming share. In addition, recent
reviews of the potential pricing power of traditional media companies seen as
holding a dominant position previously (the Competition Commission’s research into
Yell in 2006, OFCOM’s review of the radio sector in 2007) has found that traditional
“monopolies” hold far less pricing power than previously assumed, which would help
regulates advertising prices.
We see this likely de-regulation as acting as an incentive for potential acquirers to
look at being involved in ITV, before some of these potential upside opportunities
are more widely known (particularly with regards to the Conservatives’ plans) with
the sell down of the BSkyB stake from 17.9% to at least below 7.5% and probably
further as the catalyst for action. Our sum of the parts for ITV suggests a price of c.
80p.
Second, a delicate assessment is still required of those issues that lie beyond immediate visibility, and frankly rather beyond the control of the ITV boardroom – the outlook for CRR framework change, reform of public service obligations etc. Calibration efforts are ongoing and conclusions far from definitive.
And that applies incidentally to the scions of the Berlusconi dynasty. The rest my friends is a combination of intellectual laziness, journalistic excess and an unhealthy focus on faded industry executives. The important subject of financing an offer shall remain for another day.
25/09/2008 11:32:29 XE !! *GE REVISES 2008 GUIDANCE; REAFFIRMS COMMITMENT TO TRIPLE-A CREDIT
25/09/2008 11:32:28 AX !! *GENERAL ELECTRIC CO SEES Q3 SHR $0.43 TO $0.48
25/09/2008 11:32:27 AX !! *GE REVISES 2008 GUIDANCE; REAFFIRMS COMMITMENT TO TRIPLE-A CREDIT
25/09/2008 11:33:28 XE !! *GENERAL ELECTRIC CO SAYS WILL FURTHER REDUCE FINANCIAL SERVICES
25/09/2008 11:33:49 XE !! *GENERAL ELECTRIC CO SEES FY 2008 SHR $1.95 TO $2.10
25/09/2008 11:34:22 AX !! *GENERAL ELECTRIC CO REUTERS ESTIMATES FY 2008 SHR VIEW $2.21
The financial landscape has changed drastically since then, what with the Lehman Brothers Holdings bankruptcy filing, Goldman Sachs Group and Morgan Stanley converting into bank holding companies and the government’s bailout plan to allow financial companies to sell toxic assets weighing down their balance sheets.
Well, the agreement doesn’t appear to have too many roadblocks keeping Merrill shareholders from walking away. Still, there would be some consequences. According to the merger agreement, BofA has a binding option to purchase, “under certain circumstances, up to 19.9% of [Merrill’s] outstanding common shares at a price, subject to certain adjustments, of $17.05 per share.”
UBS analyst Glenn Schorr wrote in a research note, “We don’t see a breakup fee, but BAC’s purchase option brings up to $5.2 billion to Merrill and a $2 billion gain to BAC, a financial win for BAC and dilutive to Merrill.” He noted that, “given wider collateral acceptance at the Fed and bank facilities, the potential [Resolution Trust Corp.]-like government solution and the ban on short selling, which could help capital raises, we think Merrill holders may be less interested in seeing this deal happen.”
“In looking at the bailout, Merrill has to ask ‘does the package get us out of hot water?’,” says Marc Pado, U.S. market strategist for Cantor Fitzgerald. “What if the package offered by the government is such that [Merrill] looks at it and decides they never needed to be bailed and should remain stand alone?”
Still, Pado said canceling the deal is more difficult than traders may think. For one, if Merrill backed out, the company would come under much of the same trading pressure on Wall Street as before and still couldn’t survive in the same structure as it was a week ago.
*OVERNIGHT LIBOR FOR EURO LITTLE CHANGED AT 4.38%, BBA SAYS
*THREE-MONTH DOLLAR LIBOR 3.77% VERSUS 3.48%, BBA SAYS
*THREE-MONTH STERLING LIBOR 6.28% VS 6.20%, BBA SAYS
*THREE-MONTH LIBOR FOR EURO 5.11% VS 5.06%, BBA SAYS
*ONE MONTH STERLING LIBOR 5.99% VS 5.91%, BBA SAYS
*OVERNIGHT STERLING LIBOR 5.08% VS 5%, BBA SAYS
We believe Lloyds TSB’s acquisition of HBOS will create a UK bank with virtually
unassailable market share and that management will beat synergy expectations by
> 50%. However, putting two banks together makes funding more difficult,
increases exposure to property lending, and we expect will lead to a 5.6% starting
core tier 1 ratio. Though Lloyds TSB is trading at 5.5x current pro-forma earnings
including synergies, a return to 1992 loan losses and share issuance to achieve a
6.5% core tier 1 ratio would place the stock on 22x. Sell, target price 200p.
The acquisition of HBOS will give Lloyds TSB a strong market position and access
to synergies which, taxed and capitalised at 8.5x would justify £9bn of the £12bn
price tag. However, in buying a much larger bank (HBOS’ loan book is twice as
large as LTSB’s), LTSB is importing HBOS’ problems. Funding for the merged bank
will be harder to raise, not easier, given counterparty limits. LTSB is taking on an
additional £334bn of property-related lending and we estimate that purchase
accounting adjustments will see the bank £4.5bn of capital short of a 6.5% core
tier 1 ratio (despite including LTSB’s capital raised on Friday 19 September 2008).
Short term, we expect risks over loan losses and balance sheet recapitalisation
sheet by equity issue or asset sale will trump the very significant synergy benefits
of the acquisition. If we add together our standalone forecasts for Lloyds TSB and
HBOS and factor in the £1.5bn of synergies we believe are achievable, the
combined group is trading at 5.5x 2009 earnings. However, adjusting for a
potential return to 1992-level loan losses and for capital raised to return the
combined group to a 6.5% core tier 1 ratio, places the share on 22x 2009 EPS,
falling to 15x in 2011 on delivery of full synergies.
Given these concerns, we expect the shares will trade to 200p, a 30% discount to
our estimate of current tangible net asset value per share of 280p. If management
are able to produce significantly higher capital ratios in the short term, by asset
sales, capital increase, or both, we would see fundamental upside to the shares
based on medium-term earnings. However, given the downside to our target price
we downgrade to Sell from Hold. Key upside risks include an improvement in the
UK economic outlook, improvement in debt and equity market conditions and/or
the capital accretive sale of a significant part of the merged group.
Despite a year of talking about delevering and raising £21bn in fresh equity, the UK
banks reported pro-forma tangible equity/total assets of 2.2% at June 2008, in line
with Dec 2007 levels. Loans and financial assets continue to grow faster than
capital and quicker than customer discretionary income. Affordability of property
assets in the UK remains weak. We look to avoid lower capital ratios and weaker
loan portfolios. Buy Barclays, Sell Lloyds TSB/HBOS and Bradford & Bingley.
The UK banks have raised £21bn in new equity in 2008 which has helped
shareholders funds grow by 7%. However loans grew by 8% and financial assets
by 15% leaving tangible equity/total assets at 2.2%, equal to the level at the end
of last year. We believe that while the potential US superfund could draw a dotted
line under the first “act” of the banking drama – risk assets – two significant
episodes have yet to be played out: higher loan losses consistent with a European
recession and increased regulatory capital requirements.
With liquidity conditions still troubled, banks generally as levered as before, and
customers showing a deteriorating capacity to repay debt, we expect property
prices to fall further, arrears to rise, bank losses on default to rise and consensus
earnings expectations to fall further. Given the environment we believe that Lloyds
TSB/HBOS in particular should take steps to bolster its regulatory capital base.
Stocks to Buy, stocks to Avoid
Barclays is our top pick: The capital raised last week and the acquisition of
Lehman Brothers’ US business below book value propels the core tier 1 ratio to
~7%, combined with a loan book which is least exposed to commercial property
of the UK domestics. Trading on 6x 2009E we regard the share as inexpensive
relative to its prospects. Buy, TP485p.
of 5.6%, 68% of group loans in property and construction, a significant wholesale
funding requirement and relatively exposed to accounting and regulatory capital
pro-cyclicality we believe the group would benefit from raising at least £4bn in
new capital. Sell, TP 200p.
Sector valuation and risks
The UK banks are trading at 8.4x 2009E EPS, a small premium to the European
banks on 8.1x. The UK domestic banks are trading on 5.3x, half the multiple of the
UK international banks, HSBC and Standard Chartered. The domestic banks are
trading at 2.2x pre-provision profit and 1.5x tangible book value per share. Our
stock target prices are generally derived using a sum of the parts approach, as
detailed in the individual company pages in this report.
We see the risk of higher than expected loan losses as the key factor facing the
sector. As described in this report, a return to peak loan losses would reduce our
2009 earnings forecasts for the sector by almost half and eliminate almost all
earnings for the likes of A&L, B&B, HBOS and RBS.
■ Terms might still be altered, in HBOS favour
■ We continue to rate both HBOS and Lloyds TSB Underperform
strategy of growing assets far more quickly than deposits – the transformation
was so significant that by 2007 its loan to deposit ratio was within touching
distance of the old BSCT. That, it seems, has cost it its independence.
For Lloyds TSB shares though, the question is whether the disproportionate
transfer of HBOS equity to its shareholders, combined with the synergies,
offsets the risks it is taking on. In the medium term, this might be the case, but
on a 6-12 month view, we would not invest in Lloyds TSB.
strict fair value assessment that accompanies bargain purchases, i.e.
where consideration < net assets. Further HBOS Treasury marks could
reduce the ratio by 40bps, on our estimates;
• We believe the combined group could experience a 25%+ uplift in RWA as
the cycle turns. That would reduce equity tier 1 by 120bps, on our numbers;
• In 2012 (and potentially earlier) 50% of the 190bps contribution to equity tier
1 from financial subsidiaries will drop out;
• We estimate the combined group will have a £420bn wholesale funding
requirement with a loan to administered rate deposit ratio of at least 180%;
• We estimate around £100bn of wholesale funds will be <1 month maturity,
although we believe theres a highly liquid pool of assets of £75bn which
provides a lot of comfort;
• In both nominal and proportionate terms, the combine will have more
exposure to UK specialist mortgages, UK credit cards, UK personal loans,
and UK commercial property than any other UK bank all the assets we
worry about, aggregating £200bn+ or 7 times the tangible equity base.
£10bn in time. The high LTD also demands rapid de-leverage at a time when
retail and deposit growth is falling sharply, in our view. We think fixing both will
be expensive for shareholders. At 1 times tangible equity (ex in-force) we
cannot get excited. We take Lloyds TSB 12-month target price to 195p (from
220p) and HBOS to 165p (from 330p) and both remain on Underperform.
betting on who will bail out this bank, not if it will be bailed
out. Certainly, Santander could have a strategic interest in
taking over the bank and further increase its footprint in the
UK (ING and some Australian name that is currently rumored
seem to have less strategic opportunities);
we are still talking of speculation, nothing has been confirmed
or denied yet. At the end of the day, nationalization
seems also likely, as the cost stemming from this action by
far outweighs the inherent cost associated with the dramatic
loss of reliability and trust in the UK banking segment.
Against this backdrop and in view of the solution
found for NRBS, we feel that the adjustment of the support
rating could have been performed a little earlier; however,
maybe the more market-like solution found for HBOS was
needed by Fitch to verify the willingness of the market and
the regulators to provide support
The downgrade to below A-3 at S&P triggered a segregation
event. The actions to be taken are as follows:
● The servicer of the loans which currently is Bradford &
Bingley itself has to be replaced within the next 60 days.
● The loan files have to be moved physically to the LLP.
● The asset coverage test ACT has to be examined and
signed by the asset monitor KPMG
downgrade of the senior rating by Fitch to BBB- in combination
with the D-Factor of 9.1% only qualifies for a covered
bond rating of just AA-. Assumed an outstanding recovery
rating for Bradford & Bingley’s cover pool of between
91% and 100% – which might already appear a little
high given the large share of buy-to-let with all associated
features like high share of interest only and high LTV ratios
– allows for a AA+ rating. Hence, de-facto awarding a
watch negative on the AAA rating of the covered bonds
simply means that we are expecting a downgrade within
death.
… and cross effects back to the company
through the BoE SLS – the kiss of death
One if not the only remaining liquidity source for Bradford &
Bingley is the Special Liquidity Scheme of the Bank of England.
According to the scheme, covered bonds are eligible
under the following criteria:
● Mortgage or public debt out of UK and EEA
● AAA rated by at least two rating agencies
● Issued by the institution, or entities in the same group as
the institution, entering into the transaction.
So far, BRADBI covered bonds are rated
(A1wn/AAA/AAAwn), which qualifies them as collateral for
the SLS. However, if BRADBI lose its second triple-A rating,
the last ray of hope will be extinguished
The downgrades, which actually should have happened
already some weeks ago, seem to be turning out the light
for Bradford & Bingley. The covered bonds will soon no
longer be available for the SLS which – in our view – will be
the final step until Bradford and Bingley will be saved by a
white knight. The good news is that we strongly believe that
a knight will appear; whether the knight will come from Madrid
or from London or just somewhere across the channel
is still open – and probably of minor importance. The main
thing is that it better be riding a fast horse.
