Markets live chat transcript for the chat ending at 12:07 on 18 Jun 2008. Participants in this chat were: Helen Thomas (HT) Neil Hume (NH)
Informa’s announcement Monday after the close that it has
received an approach from a cash buyer. This came on the heels of
an announcement by UBM that it was breaking off talks with
Informa on a proposed all-share nil-premium merger on the basis
of price. We believe there is continued near-term upside to INF.L
stock as M&A discussions and newsflow continue.
flush other cash buyers out of the woodwork, and we would not be
surprised if Springer is back in the picture now (recall Springer
offered 630p for Informa in October 2006).
There are good cost
saving opportunities between Informa and Springer (a competitor
under private equity ownership) and a cloudier economy and lower
M&A multiples now could imply a deal below this price
sum-of-the-parts multiple of 11.7x; our price target of 525p applies
a discount to this to factor in the market’s current macro concerns;
downside risks include cyclical slowdown and relatively high debt.
Can private equity raise the financing? Although many
observers have doubted private equity’s ability to raise the ~£3.5
billion for an Informa takeout, we would emphasize ongoing
private equity interest remains in B2B assets with strong growth
and cash generation; we believe Informa’s debt paydown could be
rapid, getting to 3.7x net debt/EBITDA by y/e 2008. Potentially, a
private company with strategic interests could raise the cash.
be circling Informa and wonder if UBM may return (it has the
right to counteroffer if Informa receives a bid, which it has), but in
any case this would require a combination of price and synergies.
Informa does not need to do a deal and could well remain
independent – in its press release Informa noted that trading
conditions remain solid – so it may not be willing to sell into a
downturn. We would monitor the likelihood of a transaction
occurring before considering taking profits on this recent run-up.
We expect a bid for Informa to be pitched at c.500p, representing a 30% premium to the undisturbed price. We have again been impressed by the financial discipline of UBM.
Informa: Informa has received an approach from a third party, rumoured to be Providence Private Equity. As highlighted in our sector piece, we believe B2B groups are structurally sound, while valuations have been depressed by cyclical fears. We note the difficulties in raising £3bn+ in the current credit markets, though as a business built by acquisition/merger, Informa could be dismantled into more manageable pieces relatively easily in our view.
UBM: We have again been impressed by the financial discipline exhibited by UBM. As with Emap B2B, UBM has not been tempted to pursue a deal which it did not believe were in its shareholders best interests. Although the combination would have delivered meaningful synergies on a nil premium basis, these would clearly have been diluted had UBM had to pay a premium.
shrt stk/shrt credit bets. At that point iTraxx XO was above 500, and
S&P was in the low 1330s. We are now just above 450 XO and 1360 S&P.
mentioned above, whilst it was prudent to go from ’10 out 10′ SHORT
stks/credit to ’2 or 3 out of 10′ SHORT at the back end of last week, I
still want to retain at least some small short interest in credit and
stks, because over the course of end June and early July, we will be
transitioning from the zone of my tactical call INTO the zone of my
VERY BEARISH strategic call for Aug/Sept/Oct.
window, and whilst credit will relatively outperform stks, I still see
XO at 650/700 during this period, HiVol up at 275/300, Main up in the
130s, and IG10 at/close to 200. Whilst I think August and September are
the key risky months, the reason I’d be small shrt (now) over late June
and July, when I suspect risk assets will try to rally (1405/1420
intra-day S&P, low 70s Main, mid-130s HiVol, 425ish XO, PERHAPS!) is
that the risk is that the coming big sell off actually starts EARLIER
rather than later.
mrkts will likely rally for the next 2/4 wks, we won’t see S&P above
1405 closing/1420 intra-day, and that the risks are that the Aug/Sept
20/25% sell off actually begins earlier, in July. So for me, I want to
be positioned to capture the very big bear move coming over the next 3
months, and am prepared to see mrkts rally a bit in my face over the
next few weeks, as a fair trade off against being positioned for a sell
off that surprises by coming earlier than I expect.
I really do think much of the ‘expected’ Q3 federally induced grwth
bounce has been seen in Q2. And as we get into data for June/July/Aug,
both the seasonal adjustment in Crude falls away out of CPI – thus the
CPI data for June, July and Aug will more fully reflect the real prices
increases seen, and not some statisticians fantasy, AND the Birth/Death
Adjustment on payrolls becomes less powerful (creates less ‘jobs’) -
especially in July (the August release), when historically the B/D
adjustment is NEGATIVE.
think the markets will call the Fed’s bluff and the Fed will be found
wanting – I just can’t see them hiking rates into the peak of the
election cycle. What I do think we will see is gradually weaker and
weaker grwth data, heavy revisions downwards of H2 08 and 09 grwth and
earnings expectations and, most likely in July and/or Aug, Payrolls at
negative 150/200k yet inflation HIGHER with US CPI Headline at/close to
5%. This backdrop, and the massive credibility chasms down which the Fed
and maybe even the ECB will plummet when they fail to hike in the face
of higher inflation, will combine to give us the big risk asset sell off
discussed above.
levels at which to get UBER shrt stks and credit….its when, NOT if in
my view….
Cheers
bob
ps – anyone who can tell me what I am missing in the UK, with the FTSE
up over 1.5%, plse feel free to fwd your shrts…at this point, all I
can see and say is that the FTSE is setting itself up for a mighty big
fall…..
RBS Global Banking & Markets
Office: +44 20 7085 3249
I put out a CSI Flashnote on May 28th where I summarised my multi month
strategic and multi week tactical calls. The tactical call is so far playing
out almost perfectly. Stocks and credit did indeed make a small rally off the May
stock lows/spread wides into month end, as expected. Also as expected, the
rally was weak, S&P barely holding 1400 and the iTraxx Crossover index
struggled to get back below 450 for anymore than a few hours. And over the last
10 days we have seen S&P down at 1350 (1440 peak in May), Crossover over
500 (390s in May), Main/Europe up in the 90s (from low 60s in May) and HiVol up
in the 170s (from low 120s in May). My targets for the June sell off, which I
expect to last another week to 10 days, remain 1300/1330 for S&P, 180/200 for
HiVol, 100/110 for Main and 130s for IG 10 in the US (currently 117). And I think
Crossover can hit the 525/550 zone.
June and into July, but this will, I think, be a pretty feeble rally both in terms of
size (50/70 S&P points) and time (2 to 4 weeks). What it will do however is set up
what I think will be THE SIGNIFICANT opportunity this year to get short stocks
and/or credit (credit will react to, and ‘relatively’ outperform stocks). For me mid-
July through to October is likely to be the most bearish period we will experience
in the bear market that began in Q4 of last year. This is the period where my
strategic call kicks-in. Please refer to my Flashnote of the 28th May for details;
suffice to say that I expect S&P down at 1050 +/-50 points during this period,
with HiVol up at 275/300, Crossover up at 650/700, Main up in the 130/150 zone,
and IG10 up at 200.
thoughts. Committed readers will know that, since last year, I have insisted that
the housing/credit downturn would last a long time and have serious
ramifications. And, since I am an anti-monetarist, I have also warned since last
year that inflation is a global problem because of globalisation, which was
always going to risk putting G7 central bankers into a dangerous corner at some
particularly nasty point in time. Well, I think we have got to that point and I think
what is clear now is that the Fed/ECB will only cut this year if we see significantly
higher unemployment/growth weakness, and/or if equity markets genuinely
crater. Global inflation and the inability/unwillingness of Asia/EM to control it
means that G7 growth will have to be weaker for longer to get rid of inflation. The
problem for the West is that our growth slowdown will be gradual, slower for
longer, but will avoid a single major negative quarter. So in Q3/Q4 we are likely
to see ongoing growth weakness, driven by the squeeze on consumption and by
banks lending a LOT less and charging a LOT more, but at the same time
inflation is going to be stubbornly high, thus handcuffing the Fed and ECB. The
Fed in particular is in panic mode – it is desperate to jaw-bone the market into
believing that growth is now fixed (it is NOT) and that it has adopted Volckeresque
tone with respect to inflation (it has NOT). Many, including me, do not
think the Fed has the courage (election year!!) or indeed the need to raise rates
this year, but unfortunately USD weakness is putting the Fed into a real policy
bind. The scoop for major policy error has just super-spiked.
point for the global economy and for financial markets. Q3 is of course when the
economic bulls tell us we are ‘meant’ to see a US rebound due to the Federal
handouts – but could it be that relatively ‘OK’ Q2 growth data reflects the fact that
a lot of the cheques have already been distributed and spent, or spent in
anticipation. If so, we will see little or no Q3 bounce – something which I think the
markets will take very badly. In any case, with the new central bank ‘enviromen
+ sub-5% EM GDP = Global Recession) well into 2009. The really ugly spoiler is
that we may need to see much lower global growth in order to get lower inflation,
and the real risk is that we won’t see this level of extreme slowdown in time to
avoid major policy errors. For me, the outlook for risk assets is unreservedly
BEARISH for Q3 and Q4. The significant bearish repricing I expect to see during
August/September/October will be driven by massive negative revisions to
growth AND stubbornly high inflation, leading to earnings deterioration, massive
negative revisions to earning expectations for H2 08 and deep into 2009, weaker
and weaker credit metrics, higher and higher defaults, and on-going
problems/deleveraging in the financial sector.
short durations, non-cyclical defensive names. Avoid cyclicals, weak BBBs and
High Yield (except on a name-by-name bottom up basis in the 1st lien market).
Emerging Markets will NOT be a safe haven. Cash is the key safe haven – the
best proxy for me is 2/3 year dated AAA/AA swaps. In ‘real’ credit, I continue to
like big bank senior/LT2 risk vs corporates or vs bank equities. As I said in my
December/January Outlook presentations, 2008 is a year that is all about not
losing money and not losing your jobs. The very nasty period is soon to be upon
us – be prepared.
Industry data remains tough and Redrow’s last announcement (13/05/08) pointed to
reservations down c65% in the 5-6 weeks to that statement. We suspect not much has changed in the month since this update.
Land write downs likely
Covenant issues rising
Industry average EBITA/interest cover covenants are c3x and will be broken on our scenario analysis. Though Redrow is focussing on cash generation, an equity issue cannot be ruled out in our view.
Given the extremely poor outlook, extremely poor visibility and balance sheet risk, we reiterate our Sell rating on Redrow but with a new PT of 169p down from 208p. In our NAV we previously set our PT based on a 25% cut to land and WIP whereas now we set a PT based on a 50% cut to land values. Next trading information is FY08 trading update 03/07/08.
UK Housebuilders are surrounded with uncertainty/poor visibility on price developments and mortgage availability. There are considerable fears about land write downs and possible equity issues surrounding the sector.
We cut 2008E to July PTP to £181m from £198m and EPS to 111.0p from 121.4p. We still model on house price deflation of 6% and volume down 25% for 2009E, but we would like to stress that the risks are firmly to the downside. We now expect a price deflation of 20% annualised from H208E as quite likely, with volume down 40%. This would eliminate EBIT for F.Y09E.
We model the worst case scenario, under which prices fall by 20% and volumes decline by 40% as a scenario analysis. This would eliminate EBIT FY09E. Under the assumption of no dividend payout FY09E and stoppage of land buying over and above land creditors, we estimate Bellway
could reduce debt and land creditors from £364m to £158m by July 2009E.
Gearing thus remains moderate, even under a worst case scenario. 45% cut to book land value to give 500p PT We cut the January book value of land by c45% to arrive at a price target of 500p (down from
580p).
with the consensus, and our forecasts.
• LFL (ex fuel) is 3.4%, down from the 4.1% last seen: we were expecting 3.5%. This
running rate is a touch ahead of Tesco’s, but still represents very limited volume growth.
• There is no comment on margins, other than to say that the promotional stance has been
enhanced.
• We won’t change forecasts today but we would comment that year two numbers are
increasingly looking a stretch here.
• the underlying stance remains negative. The lack of volume growth in the industry may
drive more activity on price and that could impact forecasts materially: from mid teens
valuations that is not in the price.
• The shares have been weak but at 336p the shares still trade on 15x PE and that’s too
high. Keep selling to 300p at least.
• As an aside, we think that the continued sharpening of promotional positions from the big
4 will make life increasingly difficult for M&S, where we remain SELLERS too.
Poorish sales, margin pressures and the departure of a chief executive do not
a good announcement make. Earnings visibility is low, average debt levels
will put off bidders and the break up scenario is not value-enhancing.
slightly demanding comparisons from the previous years promotion of high ticket
electrical goods. Margins have been affected by cost pressures, price investment and the
strength of the entertainment affected the mix.
which was in line with expectations. The expected operational savings are beginning to
come through. 2 entertain, the Group’s joint venture with BBC Worldwide, has shown
strong sales growth of 29.8%, reflecting a good performance from Planet Earth in the
US and other international markets. Woolworths is currently reviewing its options in
relation to this company.
loses money in H1 and makes all its money in Q4, so there can be no explicit guidance at
this stage of the year, but we see downside risk to consensus. We recently reduced our
pretax forecast for 2008/9 from £30m to £25m. This compares with consensus of
£28m.
due to a change in our SOTP analysis. In 2007/8, Woolworths year end debt rose from
£103m to £124m. However, its average net debt increased from £113m to £246m,
reflecting the full year effect of the THE and Bertram acquisitions, and the increased
working capital requirements of the enlarged Entertainment Wholesale business.
! The increased debt has a substantial effect on the SOTP analysis, reducing it by 8.5p and
taking our Best Case SOP down to 13.3p. The problem with lower forecasts is that this
will obviously increase the average debt during the year, so we are reducing our target
price further to 9p.
Smith & Nephew lost US$1.4bn of market cap post the Q1 07 numbers, when it revealed that
US$100m of sales acquired with PLUS orthopaedics in Q2 07 were lost owing to the
“discontinuation of unacceptable selling practices”. Another sales-force reorganisation in
trauma, high launch costs associated with wound therapy and weak US endoscopy added to a
m.ixed quarter. …but some good news
traction with its competitor product in-licensed from Corin (which recently downgraded
expectations for the year) while Zimmer’s competitor product has been delayed. Furthermore,
6.-7% growth in wound management ex-US is impressive
NPWT has started well in the US, having won nine of the ten designated metropolitan areas
included in the first phase of Medicare competitive bidding program. Preferred provider, Apria,
was awarded contracts to provide NWPT to beneficiaries in seven of the nine domestic markets
included in the first phase of the homecare market. However, Q2 08 is too soon to see impact
f.rom NWPT. Valuation: DCF-derived; new Buy rating
the fundamentals ex-PLUS are strong. Our estimates are above 2009E consensus but FY 08
EPS will be very back-end loaded (33% in Q4 08) in a year in which management needs to
deliver consistently good numbers to restore confidence. UBS estimates are 10% below
consensus for Q2 08 despite the extra sales day versus Q2 07. We upgrade our rating on the
stock to Buy.
Given recent share price movements and news flow regarding potential
equity injections, we believe it is time to focus on sector fundamentals. We
would avoid companies with high leverage and short land banks. The UK
housing market is only at the start of a deep downturn, which could last up
to three years, in our view. We forecast average selling prices to fall 6% in
2008 and 8% in 2009 on the back of volumes declines of 24% and 8%. This
results in EBITDA declines of 30% in 2008E and 40% in 2009E
We believe that falling profitability and cash generation should continue to
place pressure on balance sheets, resulting in higher sub-sector leverage.
If this persists, we believe highly leveraged companies might need to raise
fresh equity to recapitalise their balance sheets.
The sector is about to enter reporting season, starting with Berkeley on
June 27. We believe this will give us better visibility on the current
environment and the potential for asset writedowns for those companies
reporting full-year results – Barratt, Berkeley, Bovis and Redrow. We
expect continued negative data points on mortgage approvals, pricing and
pricing expectations to support our Cautious coverage view.
Given the market’s aversion to house builders with high leverage, we
expect Redrow to underperform in the current environment. In addition to
strong operational gearing to an accelerating housing downturn, it is the
most highly geared housebuilder on our estimates (9.9x average 2009-10E
net debt/EBITDA). Redrow is on our Conviction Sell List, together with
Persimmon. We also rate Berkeley Se
The last major housing correction in the UK occurred between late-1988 and late-1993,
when house price growth fell by more than 35% over a four-year period. The correction
was driven by high interest rates, high mortgage payments relative to disposable income,
and high inventory levels. In the current environment, the problems are slightly different:
tighter mortgage credit, higher household inflation, record real house prices, and lower
inventory levels. We believe the sharp contraction in mortgage availability has accelerated
the house price correction and as a result, the downturn should be shorter than in the early
1990s. However, we believe that this is highly dependant on lending banks returning to the
market with competitive mortgages.
In the current environment, we believe investors should focus on cash generation and the
increase in house builder leverage over the next three years. We examine near-term cash
generation for each house builder under different price scenarios. Our analysis suggests
that Barratt, Redrow and Taylor Wimpey have the weakest cash generating capability over
the next three years. The greatest increase in leverage occurs at Redrow, Bovis and Taylor
Wimpey. Without a significant reduction in debt (or increase in cash flows) we believe
highly leveraged names will struggle in the near term and may need an equity injection.
Berkeley and Bellway appear to have the most resilient cash flows and the lowest gearing.
New equity might be needed to lower leverage
As the housing downturn has intensified, news flow on the need for balance sheet
recapitalisation has increased. We assume the optimal leverage for house builders is 3.0x
2009E net debt/EBITDA, and we analyse the impact of leveraged companies issuing new
equity via a rights issue. On this basis, Barratt and Taylor Wimpey are the companies most
likely to need a capital injection resulting in significant dilution of existing shareholder
stakes; Bellway and Berkeley are the least likely to need a capital injection.
