Markets live chat transcript for the chat ending at 12:05 on 17 Jun 2008. Participants in this chat were: Paul Murphy (PM) Neil Hume (NH)
FTSE 100 + 90 points.
That’s a LOT weaker than forecast – analysts expected circa minus 42 – got minus 52.4 instead
Published: June 17 2008 09:54 | Last updated: June 17 2008 09:54
Ben Bernanke and King Abdullah both have good reasons for wanting the oil price to come down from almost $140 a barrel.
The US Federal Reserve chairman, backed by regional Fed heads, has tried to reposition himself from dollar-dumping helicopter pilot to bona fide inflation hawk in the past week. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia’s king is seemingly doing his bit to take the heat out of oil prices by promising to raise his country’s production.
Mr Bernanke risks talking himself into a corner. High energy prices are fuelling fears of an inflation outbreak in the US. The economy, however, is in no fit state to stomach the usual medicine: higher interest rates. Even if the Fed were to act, a 25 basis point increase would not do much in the context of real rates running at, roughly, a negative 2 per cent. In any case, with inflation being transmitted through global commodities markets, the Fed’s power to curb it is perhaps more limited than in the past.
Riyadh, worried thathigh oil prices will spu investment in alternatives, may be of more help. But again, it is unclear if Saudi Arabia will deliver. Having scheduled a grand conference for next weekend, promising some extra oil is a smart political gesture. In addition, if the pledge of extra barrels does not cool prices, Opec can claim vindication for its position that speculation and a falling dollar, rather than tight supply, are fuelling crude prices.
The danger is that this move does not address the deep-seated fears about long-term supplies which are helping to boost crude futures. Hard core “peak oilers” might dismiss it is a short-term gesture and bid up oil futures further. In doing so, they would be calling into question Saudi Arabia’s ability to intervene in the market – an uncomfortable situation with which central bankers such as Mr Bernanke are all too familiar.
Royal Enclosure LawnHer Majesty’s Representative wishes to point out that only formal day dress with a hat or substantial fascinator will be acceptable.
Off the shoulder, halter neck, spaghetti straps and dresses with a strap of less than one inch and / or mini skirts are considered unsuitable. Midriffs must be covered and trouser suits must be full length and of matching material and colour.
Gentlemen are required to wear either black or grey morning dress, including a waistcoat, with a top hat which must be worn at all times when you are in the Royal Enclosure other than within your private box or facility”. Note that box balconies, restaurant terraces and gardens will be deemed to be “within” the facility.
Overseas visitors are welcome to wear the formal national dress of their country or Service dress. Those not complying with the dress code will be asked to leave the Royal Enclosure and will be relieved of their Royal Enclosure badge.
● Does the rule relate to short positions entered into before a company announced a rights issue?
● Is the disclosure to be made as it happens – for example, what happens if a short seller goes above and below the threshold several times?
● Do they report that they went over, or do they just report their position at a particular point in the day. And if so, which point in the day?
● Will the FSA publish a comprehensive list of issuers undergoing a rights issue (as the Takeover Panel does for stocks in bid situations)?
● What number should short sellers base the ‘shares outstanding’ number on – the fully diluted number; the number before the rights issue; the total after the issue has been completed?
● If a fund’s options positions are to be included, should any reporting reflect whether the options can actually be exercised during the rights issue period?
● Will the new rules – which exempt market makers such as investment banks – still be applied to the proprietary trading desks of those banks?
● Does the rule cover stocks that have a primary listing outside the UK but a secondary listing on a recognised UK exchange?
● How should short sellers treat the convertible bonds and other debt-equity hybrids, which have theoretical embedded options?
● How does the rule relate to synthetic positions (such as Contracts for Difference) and those involving complex derivatives?
The discount valuation implies a £1,170m (22%) reduction in 2009E PBT. This equates to a 39% increase to our existing impairment charge estimate. The assumptions are somewhat arbitrary, but illustrate the point that HBOS’ valuation is discounting a more significant increase in loan impairment than its UK peers. For example, if HBOS experiences 130-250bp losses on its UK corporate loans then we believe it is reasonable to expect other UK lenders to report a similar deterioration, which is not currently in our numbers (eg. we estimate 80bp at Lloyds TSB in 2009E).
In our view, the shares will continue to reflect an expectation of a significant rump placing on behalf of retail investors at the end of HBOS’ rights period, which is protracted – fully paids do not trade until 21 July.
Wet hink a repeat of the extreme provisioning of 1991 is highly unlikely.
We upgrade BARC just to Hold. Lloyds remains our only Buy, due to its higher upside and lower risk. But we are aware of the macro problems and the leverage mistakes and remain selective, keeping the two smaller undiversified domestics (A&L and B&B) as Sell.
Bradford & Bingley recently revealed that its arrears had jumped sharply, but the source of the problem appears to be its acquired loans, where arrears have reached 5%. The other banks do not have acquired loans in their UK mortgage portfolios. We also note that B&B’s average LTV at 55% is markedly higher than the more normal 45%.
We do not expect a return to the early 1990s in terms of bad debts, as the economic environment is fundamentally different. However, we stress-test our forecasts with a “nightmare scenario” that is not too far from those levels and find that except B&B, all the banks remain profitable. In this scenario we would be cutting our EPS by 30 to 50%, but at LLOY and RBS, current upsides seem to accommodate already those downgrades.
which allows us to deduce levels of negative equity for a given price fall and then forecast repossessions. We now expect a 15% fall in prices plus 15% of repossession costs (with 1.2% repossession rates – 6% for the top LTV slice – well above its previous peak of 77bp in 1991). In our worst case, we assume a 30% price fall and 30% repossession costs.
Corporate lending to see deterioration with debt service burden at peaks: The
corporate debt service burden is now back at peak levels (30%). Corporate insolvencies show a strong inverse correlation with GDP growth, which we expect to fall to 1.1% in 2009. We do not expect to see 1991 levels of impairments, but think that this is the part of the loan books that has the highest potential to disappoint. As far as commercial property is concerned, we believe the scenario is much more benign than in 1991.
Fitch Ratings-London-17 June 2008: Fitch Ratings has today downgraded UK housebuilder Taylor
Wimpey plc’s (TW) ratings to Long-term Issuer Default (IDR) and senior unsecured ‘BB+’ from
‘BBB’ and to Short-term IDR ‘B’ from ‘F2′. The Long-term IDR and senior unsecured ratings
remain on Rating Watch Negative (RWN).
to persist at weakened levels during 2008 and 2009 as a result of a worsening macroeconomic
environment, a severe contraction in UK mortgage lending and poorer sentiment among house
buyers. This, in turn, is expected to lead to a material reduction in TW’s earnings over at
least the next two years.
In view of the rapid deterioration in TW’s operating environment, Fitch’s updated forecasts
raise concerns about the company’s ability to comply with certain debt covenants over the next
18 months. The prospect of potential covenant difficulty forms a significant part of Fitch’s
rationale for the downgrade.
and potentially mitigate any possible covenant problems. However, the exact actions TW will
choose to undertake and the success of these actions remain uncertain, especially given the
difficult business and financial environment the company currently faces (partly reflected by
an approximate 65% fall in TW’s share price over the last 12 months). Although management
remains proactive in its attempts to tackle the challenges it faces, many key factors remain
outside of its control
short-term could lead to further deterioration in the credit profile, and therefore Fitch has
maintained its RWN status on TW’s Long-term IDR and senior unsecured ratings. Fitch will
continue to monitor TW’s near-term actions in an effort to resolve the watch over the next six
months. Any further downgrade could be by more than one notch.
Despite the near-term difficulties facing TW in both its UK and US markets, the ratings
continue to be supported by an expectation that the company will generate significant free
cash flow during the current downturn. This is by virtue of TW’s flexible business model,
which involves significantly reining in land purchases (supported by TW’s sizable land bank),
tightening work-in-progress (such as build costs), mothballing new developments and reducing
margins on existing sites to recycle cash out of its current developments.
steps in recent months to conserve cash flow by suspending the remaining GBP500m of its
proposed share buyback and materially reducing headcount (including the closure of 30% of its
UK regional offices).
of implementing remedial actions during a downturn, having been exposed to a US housing market
that has been in decline since 2006. However, if some of these remedial actions, such as a
freeze on land purchases, persist for a lengthy period, the business will shrink which, in
turn, could weaken the company’s business profile over the longer-term.
with a sharply deteriorating environment for the
consumer and a more difficult environment for corporate
spending, we review forecasts for all media stocks. We
have made substantial cuts in 2009 and 2010 to
consumer related names with earnings forecasts for
advertising inventory companies cut on average by 17%
in 2010, for marketing services by 12%; for BSkyB by
10% and professional publishers are down 6%. Our 2010
forecasts are now on average 14% below consensus.
frequently very low, the cyclical end of the sector
remains unattractive due to a combination of structural
deterioration, heavy downgrades and, in some cases,
leverage fears. Valuation is unlikely to return as a driver
of this sector in the coming months. We remain
Underweight on most of the broadcasters (ITV, A3, T5,
Mediaset), and lower Yell from Overweight to Equal-weight
and Trinity to Underweight from Equal-weight.
DMGT as the most interesting stocks in the sector, rated
as cyclicals but with relatively robust earnings prospects.
The ‘safe’ defensives are in the Professional Publishers
where we favour Pearson and Wolters Kluwer; amongst
the satellite stocks we like SES & Eutelsat; we continue
to believe BSkyB will be resilient (though our price target
is cut 13% to 615p). Our major change in view is that we
now expect the global ad agencies will see negative
organic revenue growth (-1% from +3.75%) in 2009. We
move WPP from Overweight to Equal-weight with a
price target of 650p (was 770p).
appears cheap on a medium term view. There are
volatile cyclical stocks that could produce very attractive
returns on a 2 year view (Pro7, Johnston). In the next
few months, however, valuations and forecasts in the
sector will remain under intense pressure and that the
catalysts for a more positive value-oriented sector call
will not be apparent.
The macro environment in which our European media
companies operate appears to be taking a lurch downwards.
This is particularly true of those companies operating in
consumer related markets. Pressure is developing from the
joint perils of rising commodity prices, higher inflation, the jump
in oil prices, lower credit availability, falling house prices and
increases in unemployment. This is likely to have a direct
impact on the desire of advertisers to market to consumers and,
in some cases, on the advertisers’ financial capacity to spend
on advertising. Away from the consumer-related areas we see
pressures mounting in the corporate environment. Finance
directors looking into the second half of 2008 and into 2009 are
likely to seek to reduce controllable costs whether in
advertising, marketing, information costs, travel and other
expenses. This means that, while the thrust of this note is to
reduce expectations for consumer-related companies, we also
take down numbers for those exposed to B2b markets and
professional publishing.
The underlying assumptions for each sub-sector and stock are
discussed individually in this note. Our broad approach is,
however, to ask the question why there should be any
advertising related growth at all in 2009.
We can illustrate this approach with reference to the global
advertising agencies. In 2008, boosted by a strong start to the
year and by the ‘super quadrennial’ factors (Beijing Olympics,
US Presidential elections, Euro 2008) most forecasters have
assumed organic revenue growth of around 5%. In 2009
estimates for organic revenue growth tend to range in the
vicinity of 3-4%. Our starting point is now to ask why there
should be any global advertising growth in the 2009. The US
and Europe are facing recessionary pressures, the consumer
is under strain and the corporate will be entering the second
year of a slowdown.
underlying growth in advertising growth globally (declines in the
US and Europe offsetting growth, itself slowing, in emerging
economies) and then to reflect the absence of the 2008 super
quadrennial ‘boost’ (150 bps of growth). As a result, our
forecasts for WPP and Publicis now assume a 1-2% decline in
organic revenue growth in 2009.
This is, let’s face it, only a reflection of the views of WPP’s CEO
Sir Martin Sorrell, who for a long time has warned of potential
global advertising slowdown in 2009. In individual countries
and advertising types, the slowdown may be both more sudden
and more marked. Last week, Roger Parry, speaking in his role
as Chairman of UK advertising agency Media Square observed
of the UK advertising market
‘the amazing speed with which the advertising economy has
tanked out in the last six months… the level to which
confidence has fallen is really scary’
We believe the new CEO will target 20% operating margins for the group by year two. Our analysis says this is very achievable and would still leave it behind the margins earned by many of its peer group. As such, we have raised the UBS EPS forecasts for Smiths by 10% for 2009/10. On our new forecasts, Smiths will achieve low double-digit EPS growth for the next f.ive years
While Mr Bowman will add an organic growth story to the Smiths investment case, we believe a break-up of the group is still likely. On our new forecasts and applying a 20% control premium for the businesses, we believe a break-up value could exceed £15 per share.
Valuation: £13.50 price target
Our £13.50 price target is derived from our sum-of-the-parts valuation. Given the different characteristics of the Smiths divisions, we believe this is the best way to value the stock. Our sum-of-the-parts valuation gives a base price of £12.41, to which we add a premium for the likelihood of the eventual break-up of the group. Smiths is in the UBS Corporate Change Portfolio and the M&A Conviction List.
This followed a month of significant share price underperformance (-24%) and in our view vindicates the value opportunity of Aero’s maturing business model.
rudimentary market fears; Aero’s is a small cap with high debt and exposure to commercial aerospace – three distinct negatives in the current environment.
As a result the valuation became heavily discounted at just 6.1x CY2009 (a 48% disc. to the sector) / EV/EBITDA 5.2x.
Therefore, while we accept that Aero’s is not immune to airlines’ plans to reduce capacity, the key growth driver remains new contracts which are coming thick and fast.
Price? The FT suggests a bid at a premium to the 52-wk high of 720p. Also, given the
supportive s/h base and mgt’s +ve view (LTIP vest at a SP of £15 or above in 2 years), we suspect a bid would need to be higher than the current price. Applying Hampson and Umeco’s CY2009 P/E multiple implies a target range of 770p (our fundamental PT) to 930p. BUY
gambling activity Gambling
Commission
that is aimed to clarify whether premises can be split and apply for
separate gambling licences and highlight the importance of the
primary activity of the gambling licence. Two key issues arise: 1.
Some companies appear not to have been operating within the spirit
of the Gambling Act and 2. The Gambling Commission seems to
view machines as a less desirable form of gambling. Any changes
are unlikely to be enacted before October 2008 and this may delay
any potential respite from the Minister of Culture, Media and Sport.
are no changes to our forecasts from this announcement.
• Bingo halls have split premises to increase gaming machines.
Rank announced at the May trading update that they had put 23
adult gaming centres (AGC) into bingo clubs. The consultation
paper suggests that it is possible to split premises but the
customers should appreciate they are in a different premises not a
different part of the same premises. We believe that it is likely that
local planning authorities (who implement this guidance on a case
by case basis) may go as far as requiring separate entrances to
ensure customers are clear about the different premises. It would
be more expensive for Rank to offer AGC or betting shops but not
impossible. However, given cash constraints we expect Rank to
delay any further introductions until clarification in October.
The consultation paper is trying to increase the uniformity of local
planning applications but we believe there is an undercurrent of
anti-gaming machine sentiment. It is clear that not only does the
Gambling Commission want operators to act within the spirit of
the law but “…also considers that it is undesirable in terms of
minimising the risk of problem gambling, for betting, bingo or
casino premises to offer only or predominantly gaming machines.”
Although the Gambling Act is less than 12 months old the
Commission is once again highlighting the problem gambling
aspect of high stake machines. This may be an issue for the UK
bookmakers if there is a material increase in problem gamblers in
the next Gambling Prevalence study published in 2010.
which may still be 6-9 months out:
have driven credit deterioration and we believe
they will keep falling through the year end. As a
result, we do not see a peak in losses until 2009.
Moreover, we see “rolling peaks” across asset
classes. To reflect our revised loss estimates, we
have lowered estimates by an average of 9%.
there is still $65bn to go relative to $120bn raised
so far by US Banks. Only 4 out of 42 deals we
track are in-the-money so far. This will make the
next round of deals harder and more expensive.
are a lagging indicator. That said, we watch for a
tightening of the consensus range, which is at
record highs. When the range tightens, it will
signal confidence in where book values stabilize
helped, although even here this has recently
reversed in part amid Fed tightening risk.
The most common question from investors is
when to buy the weaker banks. In prior cycles,
weaker banks do not outperform until the whole
sector turns. With the turnaround still some time
away, we believe it is too early to invest in weaker
banks on the back of depressed valuations.
We expect capital to be a continued differentiator
and recommend our capital trade: banks with
capital outperform those without (Bloomberg
banks to regional banks given stable earnings and
capital catalysts. Both Bank of New York Mellon
and State Street are rated Conviction List Buy. We
remain Cautious on regional banks amid credit
deterioration and rate M&I as Conviction List Sell.
Our credit views are the opposite of equity in
certain names: buy bank credit risk where the
capital raise has taken place, and sell “stronger”
banks credit in anticipation of them putting capital
to work. Specific pair trades: long C debt/short
equity, and long WFC equity/short debt.
costs did not fall in the first quarter suggesting that the year end clean up process was more than offset by the rapid rate of
deterioration in banks loan portfolios in the first quarter. Moreover, based on a detailed assessment of the expected timing of
defaults and credit losses implies peak provisioning is unlikely until early 2009. Hence, we believe that a broad based rally in
bank shares is unlikely in coming months and re-iterate our underweight stance on the regional banking sector.
• Even compared to previous banking crisis, weaker banks have underperformed the sector by a greater magnitude.
However, the underperformance can be attributed to the greater impact of the banking crisis this time round on forecast
earnings, book values and returns. Hence, the performance gap be explained by fundamentals as weaker banks have been hit
extremely hard, and the whole sector has been hit harder than even the 1990-1992 cycle (see Exhibits 1-3).
• We estimate the recapitalization process is now two thirds complete for the US banks. However, while insolvency risk has
been significantly reduced, “weaker” banks which have recapitalized will: (1) looking to reduce assets despite their strong Tier
1 ratios resulting in slow earnings growth, and (2) suffer from low returns as a result of decreased leverage. Moreover, weaker
banks are unlikely to benefit from consolidation as bank deals always slow when credit is deteriorating and larger banks are
hamstrung by their own problem assets as well as accounting requirements to mark targets to market.
• Consensus estimates are a lagging indicator of share price declines; in the 1990, 2001 and current cycles the stocks peaked
before estimates did (usually by 8-9 months), and in 1990 and 2001 stocks troughed before estimates did (usually by 4-5
months). That said, we watch for a tightening of the consensus range, which is at record highs. When the range tightens, it will signal confidence in where book values stabilize.
• Fed easing and a steeper curve have been precursors to previous turnarounds. Arguably, this has already happened,
although the Fed easing cycle has ended and the market is increasingly pricing in risk of Fed tightening in 2009. Moreover, one of the benefits of Fed easing has always been securities gains, which is not happening this cycle as banks are still sitting on near record unrealized losses.
