Markets live chat transcript for the chat ending at 12:15 on 6 May 2008. Participants in this chat were: Paul Murphy (PM) Neil Hume (NH)
likely to lead to a material upgrade of current resource estimates. We will
continue our appraisal and development programme over the remainder of 2008 with
the overall objective of achieving first production in 2010.”
Tullow Oil – upgrading recommendation to IN-LINE[TLW LN 760p], Sector OVERWEIGHT
Tullow Oil has announced that the Mahogany-2 appraisal well, offshore Ghana, has intersected a significant column of light oil (West Cape Three Points Licence, TLW 22.9%)
Management guidance is that the P90, P50 and P10 estimates will increase from 170m, 480m and 1.38bn to 500m, 1.0bn and 1.8bn respectively.
Updating our numbers to reflect the P50 estimate of 1bn barrels increases our core NAV from 371p to 500p. The P10 case of 1.8bn barrels would increase our core NAV to 700p.
We are initiating coverage of AIM-listed Regal Petroleum, with a Buy
recommendation and 390p/sh Price Objective, suggesting some 138% upside
from current levels. Bottom line, we see Regal as combining: (1) a high quality
appraisal and development asset; (2) a highly credible management team; and
(3) an exceptionally attractive absolute and relative valuation. BUY
Regal’s flagship appraisal and development asset, the MEX-GOL and SV fields in
north-eastern Ukraine, have current resource estimates ranging from 170mboe (in
the 2P reserve case) to 350mboe+ (in the most aggressive indicative resource
upside case), implying associated peak production levels of between 53kboe/d
and 100kboe/d+.
However, despite having owned this asset since 2000, Regal has historically
made little progress in delineating and monetising it, due to a combination of poor
management, legal ownership issues and capital constraints caused by the failure
of a now-infamous Greek appraisal well. With these latter two issues now behind
the company, we see the recent appointment of David Greer as CEO (formerly
Shell Director of E&P projects) as the final piece of the jigsaw which should see
Regal finally realise this asset’s significant potential.
Even allowing for significant future Ukrainian tax creep, Regal is currently trading
at a level offering investors 138% upside to our NAV (versus peer average 15%)
Further, assuming the 170mboe 2P reserve case and a conservative 4-rig
development scenario, we estimate Regal to be trading at 6.3x – 0.0x EV/DACF
2010E – 13E and 7.3x – 1.6x P/E 2010E – 13E.
Romanian/Australian Entrepreneur Frank
Timis.
Frank Timis, as an Eastern European-focused E&P company. In furtherance of
this strategy, the company conducted reviews of a number of oil and gas projects
in Ukraine between 1996 and 1999 which led to Regal participating in an
exploration joint-venture agreement with the state-owned Chernihiv exploration
and drilling company. Under the terms of this agreement, Regal acquired an initial
75% interest in the largely un-appraised/developed Mekhediviska,
Golotovschinska and Svyrdivske (MEX-GOL and SV) fields, located onshore
north-eastern Ukraine. As part of the JV agreement Regal agreed to cost carry
Chernihiv’s 25% interest through an initial exploration and appraisal phase.
c£10m, which the company ear-marked for the appraisal/development of the
MEX-GOL and SV fields and new venture activity. The company came to market
with a 2P reserve base of 185mboe (split 148mboe gas/37mboe condensate) with
an associated gross production profile certified to rise from c3kboe/d in 2002 to a
peak of c31kboe/d in 2011 by independent reservoir engineering consultants Troy
Ikoda.
Post-IPO, the company invested in its Ukrainian assets, spending a further
cUS$12m drilling new wells, working over a portion of the existing well-stock,
expanding gas processing plant capacity and investing in pipeline capacity linking
the fields to the international export trunk line to Western Europe. This investment
resulted in the Ukrainian government declaring the field commercial in December
2003. Following this declaration Regal applied for, and was subsequently
awarded in mid-2004, two 100% production licenses covering the MEX-GOL and
SV fields. As a result of this, the company’s exploration JV with Chernihiv was
legally dissolved later that year.
*MERRILL LYNCH LEVEL 3 ASSETS AT MAR 28 $82.4B VS $48.6B IN DEC
*MERRILL LYNCH GLOBAL LIQUIDITY AT MAR 28 $210B VS $200B IN DEC
*MERRILL LYNCH RESIDENTIAL SUBPRIME EXPOSURE WAS $2.7B AT DEC 31
*MERRILL LYNCH RESIDENTIAL SUBPRIME EXPOSURE AT MAR 28 $1.4B
*MERRILL LYNCH LEVEL 3 DERIVATIVE PACT LIABILITIES $25B :MER US
*MERRILL LYNCH LEVEL 3 INVESTMENT SECURRITIES $4.3B :MER US
*MERRILL LYNCH LEVEL 3 DERIVATIVE PACTS $20.6B :MER US
*MERRILL LYNCH LEVEL 3 TRADING ASSETS AT MARCH 28 $9.3B :MER US
deterioration seen in 2008 in the UK clothing market and CEO Stuart Rose’s recently expressed view that these conditions
are likely to continue into 2009. We have reduced our 2008/09E profit estimates by 8% to £830m and our initial 2009/10E
PBT estimate of £735m indicates a further 11.5% decline in profits for that year
gross margin in food and increased contribution from the International division as well as the negative effects arising from the
scenario described above. Please note that our note also critiques the company’s executive compensation scheme and its
effect on management behaviour/strategy.
the shape of longer term forecasts begins to indicate a relatively full valuation in 2009/10 with the possibility of further forecast
cuts (we have not been very severe in our assumptions here) we would expect further share price vulnerability.
explicitly to the scale of problems the mid market clothing retailers have faced in 2008, the latter likely to introduce the
cautious shape outlined here into profit guidance.
understandable as profits fall away. The 2009/10 valuation appears more extended and as we regard forecasts as still
vulnerable we are reducing our target price by 9% to 320p (previous 350p) to acknowledge this risk.
Sir, I note that the Financial Services Authority has stated its intent to police alleged insider dealing, with reference to takeovers (“Watchdog vows more bite amid rising signs of insider trading”, April 30).
Surely two of the most blatant cases of market abuse recently were the two large rights issues by Royal Bank of Scotland and HBOS.
In both cases there were leaks in the press several days before the actual announcement. The banks involved have committed themselves to “underwriting” the rights issues, even though both are at large discounts to the share prices which had both fallen considerably due to the press leaks.
I have no qualms about banks charging fees for being at risk, but if the risk has been priced into the market, why are the shareholders being charged this fee and shouldn’t the FSA investigate these leaks?
G.W. Lawson,
London SW19 7PT
$110 oil – estimate downgrades 239p
01 May 2008
assumption here up from $100/bbl to $110/bbl.
• On last disclosures, BA was very broadly half-hedged for the new
fiscal year to 3/09, and with relatively little for the year after.
Pushing oil up by 10% hence has a big effect on that year to 3/10.
• From having earnings stalled around 20p, we now move to
earnings falling through 3/10.
an 8p dividend will be restarted with the 3/08 year-end results,
due on 16 May.
decide not to commence a dividend stream, only to regret it in a
year’s time if crude is $120+ (leaving little EPS to cover it).
experience is that it takes 3 or 4 to find the trough.
• We suspect that what might be the last cut could come when all
the bearish economic trends show up as premium traffic weakness.
and the Performance Share Scheme focus exclusively on profit targets
an eps target. Total Shareholder Return is not included in these schemes
concerned with this? TSR makes potential award recipients focus on the same things that
investors do as well as profit delivery – longer term prospects principally.
which have to be held for 3 years, gives some degree of common interest between
executives and investors. But the separate Performance Share Scheme is purely an eps
based scheme with no subsequent lock-up and immediate (share based) payment on the
vesting date.
depending on where eps falls within a range determined by eps growth rates (in excess of
RPI) over a 3year period. We set out below our understanding of the levels involved based
on the available public information (mainly the 2006/07 Annual Report & Accounts pp45-6,
Remuneration Report).
balanced against how it is to be achieved, the risks involved and whether the model is
sustainable. We also show below the levels of PBT consistent with the lower and upper
achievement levels of the PSP set against our new estimates to reinforce this point.
relation to the 2006 programme where on the assumption that the company is probably
not as negative as us it could achieve improvement of eps delivery within the minimum
and maximum levels by this means without underlying performance improvement.
One can also see why management decided to embark on a relatively aggressive opening
programme in light of these charts. Historically there has been a strong belief among retail
managements that opening programmes are good because they tend to deliver a rapid
payback on investment (and thereby enhanced eps growth) where leasehold premises are
involved and scaling benefits to the existing estate through enhanced buying scale and
overhead spreading.
returns. But as opening programmes tend to be embarked on when trading is going well
management tends to disregard this in our experience. Arithmetically there is also an
argument that you are going to take the hit anyway from other peoples’ openings and your
own programme is not going to affect the overall capacity position that much.
Individually one could perhaps justify this type of thinking. Unfortunately retailers tend to
act in the same way at the same time. This is because of the retail profit cycle and more
especially the retail property development cycle where capacity tends to come on stream
in large chunks through the opening of large retail centres
need to generate superior profit growth relatively quickly because of the senior
management compensation scheme appear to us to have been at the root of the current
strategic issues.
Clearly these issues have been exacerbated by the slowing of overall demand. But
probabilities should have suggested to management in our view that there would be some
form of slowdown during the period of its strategy.
to the accelerated physical expansion is documented). Our point is that the strategy is
clearly at best challenged and at worst failed and as such we do not agree with the
company’s policy of buying back shares to enhance short term earnings even if the
company thinks the shares are cheap – which we do not think they are.
This results in major changes in stock ratings and a
defensive shift from UK to continental Europe as we make substantial price target cuts for most stocks.
Conversely, in UK
property we double downgrade to Underweight British Land (target 560p, 56%) and Brixton (200p, down 49%), and downgrade to Underweight from EW Land Securities (1030p, 40%).
The four separate valuation techniques we deploy to gauge how much downside there is in property shares to the bottom of the current bear market (which we anticipate will occur around the end of 2009) all support the bearish outlook implied by the weighted 25% potential downside implied by our new price targets.
We think we are now close to the point at which banks in the UK will pull the plug on highly leveraged companies that are in breach of banking covenants, and expect this to lead to distressed sales of properties and hence another upward lurch in property yields.
However, the associated off balance sheet leverage, allied with significant capital declines, is placing the model under stress
Significantly above-average leverage, but with strong partners
Equity investors are undoubtedly spooked by the high leverage, and the recent disclosure of the RBS facility shows the risks involved. One cannot predict which course of action best suits a
lending bank in each case of a lending breach, but we believe investors should take some comfort from the fact that Morley and Hermes are the fund managers and, in some cases, the major investor in the three main funds.
We believe that Capital & Regional is relatively secure at the group level, with ample undrawn facilities and c£30 million of recurring profits, which should enable it to cope with some of the problems that might occur on the smaller investments. In addition, we believe the group has time to take offsetting measures.
Valuation: Upgrade to Buy
We resume coverage of Capital & Regional, with an upgraded Buy rating. Our new price target of 500p represents a 22% discount to our low-point NAV estimate (December 2009). At that price we believe the shares would yield just under 6%.
The deal, prompted by the effect of the credit crunch on business, is likely to send shockwaves through the building industry.
It is understood this is the second time Bellway has approached Redrow with an all-share merger proposal.
At Friday’s closing price, Bellway, with shares at 7161/2p, had a stock market value of £824 million while Redrow, at 2631/4p, was valued at £421 million.
Though Bellway is almost double the size of its target, Redrow has a larger land bank of 25,750 plots compared with Bellway’s 23,000 plots.
Both companies feel their value is not adequately reflected in their current share prices. If the deal goes ahead, they could face complex discussions to decide their respective values within the proposed merged vehicle.
and 35.6p
statement from the group this morning. Although sector newsflow remains
weak, we believe that this is factored into the current share price.
Bovis IMS. There is nothing in this morning’s statement which should surprise anyone.
The group comments that market conditions since April have significantly deteriorated as a result of the tight conditions in the lending market.
Outlook and forecasts. The group has commented that if market conditions persist,
results for the full year will be below the board’s expectations at the time of prelims.
Whilst we have seen two downgrades since then, and our December 2008 EPS of 40.1p and December 2009 EPS of 35.6p are in line with consensus, it would not be a surprise to see a further downgrade to numbers, although we will firm up expectations after the analysts call this morning.
The group’s debt currently stands at £92m (the peak position of the year), and compares to the group’s committed facilities of £220m (2010 maturity). Given the strength of this balance sheet, the group will continue to open sites, which should help it to maximise sales revenues. Furthermore, Bovis has the best invested landbank in the sector, with 50% of its holdings delivered from its strategic land bank.
Valuation, target price and recommendation. The shares are currently trading on a
PNAV of 0.78x and yield 8.5%. We believe that this factors in the current negative
newsflow. Our target price is based upon the last reported NAV, and is set at 599p. We herefore maintain our Buy recommendation.
update on trading.
Following a review of the working capital requirement of the business, typically
carried out each year at this time, the Company has extended its existing
Revolving Credit Facility by #23m to #123m until 2012 on the same covenants.
This provides good working headroom to meet temporary fluctuations as required
and facilitates the early implementation of the cost reduction programme updated
below. The additional facility is at a margin and fees consistent with the
market.
improves the cash generation outlook for the business. Savings of #6 million in
the current financial year to 31 January 2009 were identified at that point
which, when fully implemented, should result in annualised savings of #8
million. Vanco is pleased to announce that additional savings of #2 million have
been identified, increasing annualised savings to #10 million
expected to be completed largely by 31 July 2008 with most of the financial
benefit falling in the second half of the year. The cost reduction is largely
being achieved through general overhead control and head count reduction which
has been made possible by the significant investment in software and systems the
Company has made in the last few years, and by moving certain jobs to its low
cost centres in South Africa and Eastern Europe. To date, 105 jobs have been
moved from high cost countries, and that will be increased to 150 jobs by 31
July 2008
for the business, will enable us to maintain and improve service delivery to
customers and, for the first time, will result in the year-on-year operating
costs of the business being lower.
The company is pleased to confirm that current trading continues to be good and
the pipeline of opportunities is strong, with Vanco selected as preferred bidder
for over 20 per cent more new business opportunities as at 31 March 2008 than at
the same time last year (these are all subject to contract).
its securities pending clarification of its financial position.
against the carrying value of certain assets are expected. The profitability of
the business for the year ended 31 January 2008 is also being reviewed and may
be the subject of revision. The Company is therefore unable to update the market
accurately on its historic financial results and inform the markets accordingly
audited results for the year ended 31 January 2008 by 30 May 2008 as is required
by the Disclosure and Transparency Rules. A further announcement will be made in
this regard in due course.
On 1 April 2008 it was announced that the Company had agreed an extension to the
Company’s revolving credit facility (“RCF”) with its syndicate of banks in the
sum of #23.3m, taking the total available under the facility to #123.3m. The
Company has limited headroom under the RCF and other facilities. The Company is
in active discussions with its banking syndicate in respect of its financial
position.
options with its advisers and bankers.
Directorate change
Allen Timpany, Chief Executive Officer and founder of the business, has resigned
with immediate effect.
Andrew Coppel, the former Chief Executive of Jockey Club Racecourses and Queens
Moat Houses plc, has joined the Company as Chief Restructuring Officer.
For further information contact: -
John Mumford (Senior Independent Director) – 020 8636 1700
Katie Tzouliadis – Biddicks – 0207 448 1000
Morten Singleton – 020 8636 1700
BG wants free gas
BG Group’s bid for Origin Energy is beginning to look like another
example of Australian institutional investors selling resources assets
too cheaply to foreign buyers.
At $14.70 cash per share, the price is a 40 per cent premium to Origin’s
last sale. However, Origin’s share price is now sitting around $14,
instead of trading above the bid price as usual, because no hedge fund
is prepared to bet on a higher price. The impression you get is that
it’s all over bar the shouting and Origin’s shareholders are falling
over themselves to sign the acceptance forms.
Not so fast. Origin’s board should – and, I believe, will – reject BG’s
first offer and the British firm will have to pay more for a board
recommendation.
The bid is focused on Origin’s coal-seam gas reserves in Queensland,
which BG wants to convert to LNG at a new plant in Gladstone and export
to Asia. Those reserves are about to be substantially upgraded.
Moreover, the price BG is offering is well below what the existing
reserves are worth.
Including debt, the enterprise value inherent in the bid price is $16.4
billion.
Ivor Ries of Baillieu Stockbroking puts a value on Origin’s holding in
Contact Energy (the New Zealand gas company) of $6.5 billion and on its
non-coal-seam gas businesses of $7.9 billion.
That means BG is offering a bit less than $2 billion for the coal seam
gas reserves, which currently total 3,500 petajoules and are likely to
be increased to 4,900 PJ.
At current reserves BG is paying 57c per gigajoule (there are million
gigas in a peta); on the expected increased reserves figure for 2008,
it’s 40c per gigajoule. And if, as expected, reserves increase to 6,000
petajoules in two or three years, the price being offered for the gas by
BG falls to zero.
The average of recent gas transactions is around 90c per gigajoule.
In other words, BG is trying to get Queensland coal-seam gas via Origin
at half price or less. Fair enough: nothing wrong with that.
What would be wrong is selling it at that price.
