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Markets live transcript 21 Apr 2008

Markets live chat transcript for the chat ending at 12:09 on 21 Apr 2008. Participants in this chat were: Paul Murphy (PM) Neil Hume (NH)

PM:
Welcome to Markets Live.
PM:
This is FT Alphaville’s daily markets discussion
PM:
Neil Hume is with me.
PM:
Booting up
PM:
So he’ll just be 20 minutes or so
PM:
Get your comments in below!
PM:
Thanks for all the funnies on Junk Mail
PM:
Remind me of another one i had a few years ago:
PM:
Cashpoint
PM:
Cashpoint
PM:
Cashpoint
PM:
Cashpoint
PM:
That should register on some guy’s screen at Lloyds TSB
PM:
They own the rights to Cashpoint — and we have to get their permission to use the word Cashpoint
PM:
Apparently
PM:
Gen — not sure what is wrong with Live prices
NH:
Portakabin
PM:
Hi there
NH:
morning all
NH:
took 10 mins to boot up this morning
NH:
that joy of using dell
PM:
We’ve had just another one of those lazy Monday mornings, where we potter about eating croissants, dipping into the odd bit of news, laughing at nonsense in the Sunday press that sort of thing.
NH:
Murphy is being sarcastic. Just to be clear
PM:
Hmm. We have actually been rushing about trying to get a handle on this new Bank of England thingy.
NH:
I think Thingy should have a capital T in this context.
PM:
Yes, the Special Lending Facility – the SLS
PM:
Thingy
PM:
And then we have been wading thru the UBS mea culpa
NH:
Yeah, have you read that. Just fascinating.
PM:
It’s 50 pages. I’ve skimmed it.
PM:
THERE’S TOO MUCH GOING ON
NH:
Calm, calm
NH:
let’s go Draismaland
PM:
breaking news from Teun Draaismaland of Morgan Stanley
Draaismaland – a warm and happy place, home of the former Super Bull, Teun Draaisma of Morgan Stanley. Sadly, it turned out to be make-believe
NH:
The bear market rally is over
NH:
MSCI Europe is now up 11% since its trough on March 17. The biggest certainty for the next 12 months, in our view, is that there will be a big earnings miss, as margins are at all-time high levels while top-line growth is slowing and costs are rising, and expectations are too high. However, as is common in bear markets, we expected a bear market rally of 10%+ on the back of a drastic policy reaction to the problems at hand. See for instance The Nature of Bear Market Rallies – Playing With Fire, February 4, 2008 and That’s Enough For Now – Bear Market Rally, January 23, 2008 – markets are up 3% since January 22.
NH:
We think that the bear market rally is now over, mainly because most policy action has now been taken or is now fully expected, while our all-important market timing indicators have given us the warning that the rally is over. We move back from a 5% overweight equities to a neutral position, while making cash our preferred asset by going from neutral to overweight, and keeping bonds on an underweight. We are buying Total and Akzo Nobel, selling HBOS, British Land, Kingfisher. We are now firmly OW Defensives, UW Cyclicals and Financials.
PM:
Helen’s doing a full post on that — so have a look on the AV home page a little later
PM:
PM:
We must do the SLuSh story — copyright G Cox
NH:
Just talk us thru the SLS – what is it, how does it work, what are the repurcussions?
PM:
Well I don’t know do i?
PM:
Gone STRAIGHT over my head.
PM:
First thing I had to do was ask what is the three-month general collateral repo rate?
PM:
PM:
When its at home.
PM:
Anyway – I’ve lined up an expert to explain all this. Unfortunately she’s late or gone for breakfast
PM:
Or she’s shy= or busy or something
NH:
So we may have to stumble on, on our own – shaken by the knowledge that quite a few readers know much more about this than we do.
PM:
Hmm.
PM:
What we can say is that salvation is not yet upon us.
PM:
The terms are arguably tougher than the banks were expecting.
PM:
Banks will be charged a fee equal to the spread between three-month Libor and the three-month general collateral repo rate. The latter, which involves the temporary exchange of cash for gilts, should be close to risk-free rates on gilts of a comparable duration. So the fee paid by banks should narrow as Libor, hopefully, returns towards risk-free rates. The cut off spread of 20bp is about where Libor would normally sit, versus the 90-odd basis points at which it’s been stuck. In opting for a spread over the GC repo rate, rather than the base rate itself, the Bank has maintained a market risk element in the spread.
NH:
Hang on – you are just cutting and pasting that from Helen’s post on Alphaville earlier!
PM:
So wot?
PM:
God gave you eyes, plagiarise.
NH:
Hmm. What else did she say?
PM:
The penalty of course is the haircuts – which are huge.
Remember these are all triple-A rated securities. But a residential MBS, say, that’s floating rate or that’s fixed with less than 3 years to maturity will get a 12 per cent haircut. Then there’s the extras: 3 per cent more for currency risk when securities are non-sterling and 5 per cent for own name eligible covered bonds, RMBS and credit card ABS.
Crucially there’s also a 5 per cent extra penalty for “securities for which no market price is observable.” That final hit will be imposed on a valuation using the Bank’s own calculation and “the Bank’s valuation is binding.”
PM:
The central bank isn’t giving lenders much leeway here – with the gap between the amount borrowed and the value of collateral ranging from 10 to 30 per cent. That’s rather more than under the Bank’s recent three-month lending programme.
NH:
Obviously the big thing to watch is LIBOR – be watching for that around 11.40
PM:
Won’t see immediate effect tho, surely.
NH:
I suppose the wider point here is that there is a clear split between the Treasury and the BoE
PM:
I think you are right
PM:
Merv is not playing ball
NH:
he’s is not backing down
PM:
not playing enthusiastically anyway
NH:
he wants a pound of flesh from the banks in return for this facility
NH:
anyway it is not enough for the Council of Mortgage Lenders
NH:
Their spokesman described the £50bn facility as “conservative”
PM:
PM:
Course it is!
NH:
give’m £100bn
NH:
or £150bn
NH:
good question from Helen there
PM:
Thank you BSB for that penetrating comment below
NH:
other quick thing to note is the reaction of the banks to all this
NH:
they started quite brightly
NH:
RBS got up to 398.75p
NH:
but once the terms of the SLS – or SLUSH as it has been dubbed already – they went into reverse
PM:
You will get a letter of complain from Cox you know — using SluSh
NH:
so we now have
Royal Bank of Scotland Group (RBS:LSE): Last: 375.25, down 8.75 (-2.28%), High: 398.75, Low: 372.00, Volume: 99.24m
Barclays (BARC:LSE): Last: 486.50, down 9.5 (-1.92%), High: 505.50, Low: 479.00, Volume: 29.32m
Lloyds TSB Group (LLOY:LSE): Last: 453.00, down 0.25 (-0.06%), High: 462.75, Low: 447.75, Volume: 12.59m
HBOS (HBOS:LSE): Last: 559.50, up 1.5 (+0.27%), High: 579.50, Low: 549.00, Volume: 16.92m
HSBC Holdings plc (HSBA:LSE): Last: 848.50, down 7 (-0.82%), High: 855.50, Low: 844.50, Volume: 11.44m
PM:
Hmm — not what was supposed to happen
NH:
nope
PM:
NH:
and now to some breaking news
PM:
NH:
Royal Bk Scot.Grp.-Announcement
RNS Number:7246S
Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC
21 April 2008

The Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc
21 April 2008

Announcement

Following its statement on Friday 18 April 2008 and recent speculation The Royal
Bank of Scotland Group plc confirms that it is considering a Rights Issue. A
further announcement will be made in due course

PM:
when did that come out?
NH:
First thing this morning
NH:
let me just recap the news
PM:
NH:
let me just recap the news
NH:
RBS is considering a right issue
NH:
of course for the details you will have to go the press
NH:
because the company does not want to release a proper detailed statement
NH:
so here they are:
NH:
Peter Thal Larsen, our banking correspondent, says that RBS is targeting a tier one capital ratio of 6%
NH:
which implies RBS will have to raise around £10bn and they don’t write anything off
NH:
but as our paper said on Saturday, RBS is expected to reveal about £4bn of losses from the credit turmoil
NH:
and some people reckon it will be more
PM:
So that means either the rights issue will have to bigger
PM:
£12bn perhaps
NH:
and they will have to sell assets
NH:
and possibly announce a scrip dividend
PM:
really?
PM:
At the AGM
NH:
that’s one rumour doing the rounds this morning
NH:
although I am not sure whether they can
NH:
the dividend was announced with annual results in February
PM:
I suppose shareholders could vote to change it
PM:
and as they are being asked to cough up at least £10bn
PM:
it would seem to stupid to take a payment with one hand then hand it back with another
PM:
might as well cut out the post man
PM:
electronic post man of course
PM:
anyway, how much is the dividend worth??
NH:
£2.3bn
NH:
so if they move it to scrip, that a pretty chunky saving
NH:
and its a lead that a lot of the other banks will follow
PM:
That on its own should cost Goodwin his job — canceling the divi
NH:
of course the upshot of scrip divis is further dilution
NH:
but if needs must
PM:
Hmmm — got any analyst comment on this?
NH:
yep
NH:
loads of it
NH:
This is from Cazenove
NH:
Royal Bank of Scotland – (RBS.L RBS LN 384p IN-LINE/NEUTRAL)
NH:
Speculation is so virulent that it seems certain, in our view, that RBS will announce a rights issue this week; this morning RBS has confirmed that it is “considering a rights issue”. We believe that the timing of the issue (should it happen) was triggered by regulatory pressure (more than political) and the continued weak trading conditions in the credit markets.
NH:
Expect £13-15bn capital issuance
NH:
We estimate that adjusting for Basel II (not yet disclosed by RBS), higher capital requirements on trading assets and the mooted £4bn write-downs on sub-prime and other assets, RBS in total needs to raise £13-15bn to reach an equity tier 1 of 6.0% by the end of 2008. Asset sales, including Direct Line, could reduce the equity issuance to £9-10bn.
NH:
The AGM on Wednesday (23 April) provides an opportunity to change the dividend to a mandatory scrip raising £2.3bn to reduce the size of the rights issue.
Post the equity issuance, we estimate that RBS would trade on 6.5-7.0x 2009E PER, 1.7x P/NTAV and yield c. 6.6%. We assume a 23% cut in the dividend (adjusted for bonus element).
NH:
Change recommendation to IN-LINE
In anticipation of the recapitalisation of RBS, we change our recommendation to IN-LINE. A recapitalised RBS would merit a rating closer to its peer group in our view, though RBS still has the integration risk of ABN, and in particular how costly it will prove to shrink the Dutch wholesale bank’s bloated £500bn balance sheet
NH:
. Like all UK banks, the banking business of RBS has yet to see the effects of the slowing economy on loan impairment which will continue
to act as a restraint on the valuation. Further given the high probability of other banks issuing capital RBS needs to ensure that it raises enough so that a fresh round of doubts does not
emerge over the capital position. We expect to revisit the recommendation once the company releases the details of the anticipated announcement.
NH:
and this is from Merrill Lynch
NH:
Imminent rights issue to resolve weakened balance sheet?
Given the level of press comment, we would be surprised if RBS does not
announce a substantial rights issue in the next few days which, if announced
could, we think both improve balance sheet ratios and offset credit market losses.
Our estimate suggests that any imminent rights issue may be up to 30% dilutive
and could largely eliminate the traditional PER discount at which the stock has
traded relative to the sector. However, it is hard to draw broader sectoral
conclusions until the nature of the issues at RBS become more apparent
NH:
But strategic questions remain
From an investment perspective, we think if the historic concern about the
aggressive capital structure is removed and legacy credit issues are dealt with,
there is however still the issue of the attractiveness of the business mix and
strategic positioning of the franchise to consider. In our view, for RBS to outperform
its peers, we probably need to see a shift away from capital intensive low
PER businesses towards investment in higher growth and PER businesses
through build-out of the acquired ABN AMRO assets. A disposal of the US
regional bank could potentially underscore the shift in management thinking,
improve the growth profile of the group and provide additional capital to invest in
the recently acquired international platform, in our view
NH:
Remain in Neutral
Given the uncertainty over the likelihood and timing of a rights issue couple with
further uncertainties over the level of potential credit marks and/or business
disposals, we remain Neutral for now
NH:
and remember Merrill is one the banks that is going to underwrite the RBS cash call
PM:
OK thanks for all that
PM:
anymore to say?
NH:
yep
NH:
but I think the wider point here is that this is being driven by the FSA
NH:
they obviously screwed up over Northern Rock
NH:
got slaughtered for it
NH:
and are going to make damn sure it is not going to happen again
NH:
so, they have gone back and looked at the tier one ratings of the banks
NH:
and decided that RBS
NH:
ss running on a capital base that is too thin
NH:
and they have told them do something about it
NH:
you can imagine the conversation
NH:
your business model – running a low capital base on the grounds that you need less capital because you are more profitable than everyone else – is too risky
NH:
and it must change
PM:
Well that’s one view
PM:
i agree — but it also suits the banks politically
PM:
They can blame the rights on regulators rather than their own business practices
PM:
Fact is write downs have eaten capital — and it needs replacing
NH:
and the other point to make here is…
NH:
and if RBS are going to operate with 6% tier capital in future
NH:
they are going to be less profitable
NH:
their return on equity is going to be lower
PM:
Hmmmm
NH:
hang on a minute here’s some more from the Merrill note
NH:
it highlights how RBS got into this mess
NH:
Back to First Principles
NH:
RBS has historically always adopted a relatively leveraged balance sheet relative
to its UK and international peers. Indeed, we can only recall a brief moment in the
last 15 years, in 1999, when RBS’s core equity Tier 1 ratio was meaningfully
above 5%, and that was due to the fact that the company had raised equity
capital to partially fund what ultimately was the abortive acquisition of Birmingham
Midshires.
NH:
As can be seen above, RBS’s core equity Tier 1 has traditionally been managed
between 4% and 5% with the ratio at the low end of that range immediately after
inorganic activity by the group. These include:

The Bank of Ireland minority interest in Citizens 97/98;

NatWest (2000);
Royal Bank of Scotland

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