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Would the real distressed debt funds please stand up?

It has been more than six months since the opportunists raced to raise “dislocation” funds in the hope of snapping up souring collateralised debt obligations and leveraged buy-out loans at a discount.

But so far, hardly any of that money has been put to work. The reason? It’s Catch 22. The banks don’t want to sell at substantial discounts and recognise losses, but these dislocation funds were raised to deliver high returns and need substantial discounts to par value from the banks.

Last year, the banks offered and received bids from these funds for unsyndicated loans in names such as First Data, or the mezzanine loans in Boots, at prices closer to 96, or 4 per cent below par.

Since then, these loans have traded 10 per cent or more below par - meaning buyers such as traditional high-yield hedge funds are also sitting on losses and become forced sellers, as they face margin calls and redemptions.

It must be very tempting to buy senior loans such as ProSieben at 73, when the return on buying could be more than the return its owners KKR and Permira achieve on the equity.

As prices approach the required yields these funds are targeting, their managers must ask themselves if they’re falling into a similar trap as those investors that bought loans closer to 96.

A distressed loan may look attractive at 90 cents if you believe it will return to par and deliver a target return of, say, 12 per cent.

But if these dislocation funds fear defaults, then the required discount may have to be steeper as it is not clear even senior secured loans will get back all their money in the event of default: 80 may be the new 90.

High-yield debt is illiquid at the best of times, it is not like trading Vodafone. Timing the point of market entry and exit is crucial.

But that is what these funds are paid to do, and must do, if they want to break the deadlock in the distressed debt market.

lina.saigol@ft.com