Criticism of banks who marked assets at “level three” for accounting purposes is gaining a fair bit of ground. Until now, Goldman Sachs has taken the heat as the biggest level three booker on Wall Street. But on Monday Citi filed a claim with the SEC tripling it’s previously stated level three ledger. The bank now has $134.8bn booked at level three.
Under Financial Accounting Standards Board Statement 157, financial institutions can book assets at level three values when the market cannot efficiently price the assets itself. Whether the market is “efficient” is at the banks’ discretion. Under level three, banks’ can effectively price assets at how much they think they should be worth.
Via comments on Nouriel Roubini’s blog, here’s an interesting little exercise:
Level three to equity ratios
Citigroup
Equity base: $128bn
Level three assets: $134.8bn
Level 3 to equity ratio: 105 per cent
Goldman Sachs
Equity base: $39bn
Level three assets: $72bn
Level 3 to equity ratio: 185 per cent
Morgan Stanley
Equity base: $35bn
Level three assets: $88bn
Level 3 to equity ratio: 251 per cent
Bear Stearns
Equity base: $13bn
Level three assets: $20bn
Level 3 to equity ratio: 154 per cent
Lehman Brothers
Equity base: $22bn
Level three assets: $35bn
Level 3 to equity ratio: 159 per cent
Merrill Lynch
Equity base: $42bn
Level three assets: $16bn
Level 3 to equity ratio: 38 per cent
Now of course, simply because assets are priced at level three does not mean the sky is falling in. Often there is a good reason why they are marked so. But as a broad observation, level three assets are illiquid and therefore carry a certain amount more risk than other readily tradable - and disposable - assets.
Interesting then that two of the banks the market is least worried about - Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley - have level three to equity ratios far higher than their suffering peers, Merrill Lynch and Citi.
One key thing to consider, of course - that these figures don’t reflect - is how well hedged against these level three positions banks’ are. Citi, as was made clear by Gary Crittenden, Citi chief financial officer, in a conference call on Monday, has had trouble in tying down counterparties. Not so for Goldman.
Reflections on the New GAPP Accounting Rules (FASB #157)
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I am totally at awe how U.S. government officials have allowed the adoption of such a policy without thorough open public discussions and education. Has anyone done a detailed cost-benefit anlysis before implementing such accounting rules? I can very quickly think of some of the major costs of such a policy: knocking major U.S. financial institutions like BAC, C, CCF, ABK, MS, etc. to their knees; totally losing domestic and foreign investors’ confidence in U.S. institutions and therefore the U.S. dollar; snowballing effects rolling from the financial sector to other sectors of the economy.
Shouldn’t the new accounting rules be implemented in stages to lessen “all exit for the door” effect?
Because of the double-entry principle of an accounting system, it would make more sense to charge the impairment of the loan portfolio — mostly built over a period, based on actual loss experiences on specific group of products over time rather than marked the entire portfolio to the whimsical market at a given moment. Many financial institutions have fiscal year ending in Nov., so this is a particularly sensitive month.
Even assuming the desirability of a marked-to-market system, shouldn’t the price be based on some kind of moving averages rather than at a particular instant?
Finally, I think the attempt to make balance sheets, from quarter to quarter, reflect momentary changes in market, rather than the loan portfolio’s book values just creates mischief, not more accurate accounting or visibility.
pcyhuang