<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><?xml-stylesheet title="XSL_formatting" type="text/xsl" href="/lib/css/styleRSSFeed.xsl"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:ft="http://www.ft.com/FTRSSExtensions">
<channel>
	<title>Comments on: The full subprime letter from Hayman&#8217;s Kyle Bass</title>
	<link>http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2007/08/21/6727/the-full-subprime-letter-from-haymans-kyle-bass/</link>
	<description>FT Alphaville from FT.com</description>
	<copyright>Copyright The Financial Times Ltd 2006. "Alphaville", "FT" and "Financial Times" are trademarks of the Financial Times.</copyright>
	<webMaster>help@ft.com</webMaster>
	<pubDate>Wed, 20 Aug 2008 10:10:08 +0000</pubDate>
	<lastBuildDate>Wed, 20 Aug 2008 10:10:08 +0000</lastBuildDate>
	<ttl>5</ttl>
	<language>en</language>

	<item>
		<title>by: Pink Elephant</title>
		<link>http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2007/08/21/6727/the-full-subprime-letter-from-haymans-kyle-bass/#comment-5888</link>
		<pubDate>Sat, 25 Aug 2007 10:11:18 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2007/08/21/6727/the-full-subprime-letter-from-haymans-kyle-bass/#comment-5888</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[On more thing... The current reported delinquency rates of ~2% I looked up when researching my first post (which was about “all things mortgage related Anxiety Disorders") was not it turns out relevant to the subprime mortgage subset taken in isolation. I've been doing a bit more browsing on the topic of subprime delinquency rates and noticed something that might interest Alphavillers...

Firstly I thought it would be fun to benchmark the doomsayers against their own past predictions and found this interesting and apparently well informed blog from January, http://wallstreetexaminer.com/blogs/winter/?p=301 , which sums up fears for the 2004 and 2005 vintages...

Then I found an IMF report, http://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/SCR/2007/cr07264.pdf , from early this month on the whole US economy of which page 8 is relevant. 

The graph on  page 8 of the IMF report shows 2005 vintage delinquencies peaking early and falling back (c.f. 2001 delinquencies on the same chart)... I believe this is BECAUSE "no docs subprimes" have a different half-life* to regular subprimes. The strange shape of the 2004 subprime delinquency curve fits this theory like a glove**. What does this imply for the 2006 vintage?

THE IMPLICATION IS THAT 2006 VINTAGE SUBPRIMES WILL LIKELY PEAK VERY SOON (WITHIN 6 MONTHS***) AT BELOW 11%... i.e. Things aren't going to be nearly as bad as some people think and the doomsayers will be "surprised" (assuming they didn't talk the market down on purpose) by how quickly things improve - Don’t panic!!!! ;o)

*different half-life => different delinquency behaviour - It seems obvious to me that "no docs subprimes" will go belly up much sooner than traditional subprimes on average.  The IMF graph shows this...

**If we agree with the aforementioned blogger that 2004 was back-loaded with "no docs subprimes" then the late breaking sharpe peak superimposed on the regular pattern is easy to explain. Notice how the blogger (writing six months ago) got it completely wrong about the 2004 vintage (and also the 2005 vintage) both of which have improved from their elevated delinquency levels quickly.

***Quicker delinquency for "no docs subprimes" not only implies a sharper peak but also NEAR BY peak!]]></description>
				</item>
	<item>
		<title>by: EasyHUD - Foreclosure Resources for Everybody&#187; Blog Archive &#187; Foreclosures up 60% in Hawaii ... and other foreclosure news!</title>
		<link>http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2007/08/21/6727/the-full-subprime-letter-from-haymans-kyle-bass/#comment-5874</link>
		<pubDate>Thu, 23 Aug 2007 17:06:05 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2007/08/21/6727/the-full-subprime-letter-from-haymans-kyle-bass/#comment-5874</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[[...] Subprime letter from Hayman’s Kyle Bass (ftalphaville.ft.com) [...]]]></description>
				</item>
	<item>
		<title>by: gregory</title>
		<link>http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2007/08/21/6727/the-full-subprime-letter-from-haymans-kyle-bass/#comment-5872</link>
		<pubDate>Thu, 23 Aug 2007 16:30:31 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2007/08/21/6727/the-full-subprime-letter-from-haymans-kyle-bass/#comment-5872</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[i would say making a quick buck went before reputation this time]]></description>
				</item>
	<item>
		<title>by: Pink Elephant</title>
		<link>http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2007/08/21/6727/the-full-subprime-letter-from-haymans-kyle-bass/#comment-5871</link>
		<pubDate>Thu, 23 Aug 2007 15:04:02 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2007/08/21/6727/the-full-subprime-letter-from-haymans-kyle-bass/#comment-5871</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[Oops - It is also true that just because something gets securitised it DOES NOT become safer in and of itself.]]></description>
				</item>
	<item>
		<title>by: Pink Elephant</title>
		<link>http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2007/08/21/6727/the-full-subprime-letter-from-haymans-kyle-bass/#comment-5870</link>
		<pubDate>Thu, 23 Aug 2007 15:01:53 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2007/08/21/6727/the-full-subprime-letter-from-haymans-kyle-bass/#comment-5870</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[Gregory - Well I think we have reached a concensus... The truth is panic attacks can have real consequences and that is not something I would dismiss lightly. It is also true that just because something gets securitised it become safer in and of itself. Lax lending standards have consequences and should have... The inputs into structured finance pricing must be adjusted if underlying standards have dropped and this drop may have gone unobserved (to me NINJA subprime lending being touted as regular subprime is a kind of fraud) - However I am inclined to believe that only a tiny minority of notionally AAA structured products have been mis-rated BECAUSE ratings agencies rely on their reputations too much to risk them for a fast buck... On which point there are a lot of IF's and not enough BECAUSE's in your last post for my liking - Let's just wait and see IF the US economy can live with tighter credit conditions or IF we are all doomed - Don't panic!!!! ;o)]]></description>
				</item>
	<item>
		<title>by: gregory</title>
		<link>http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2007/08/21/6727/the-full-subprime-letter-from-haymans-kyle-bass/#comment-5869</link>
		<pubDate>Thu, 23 Aug 2007 14:22:41 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2007/08/21/6727/the-full-subprime-letter-from-haymans-kyle-bass/#comment-5869</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[PinK Elephant:

I agree that we should not argue too much semantics here. Nevertheless, I would say a big diffrecence between the tranched ABS refered to in the presentation is that it's assets consist of raw subprime mortgages. I would say a CDO would rather be made up of 'distilled material', like ABS securities(this off course is different in the case of CLO's, but then again that is because of the size of Leveraged loans)

My point is that a squared CDO situation would be slightly different(and even more of a black box) as it's assets would consist of CDO securities, which in turn belong to CDO's that are repackaging ABS securities.  It would look a little bit like this:

Squared CDO > CDO> ABS> pool of mortgages

So in the case of a squared CDO there would be an extra layer of leverage. 


Besides this, I think the point of both the letter and the presentation is that once the market is scared out of structured credit in general, it is going to be very difficult to put together and sell additional CDO's, which in turn will put a end to cheap and easy credit, both a the level of the consumer/homeowner and at the level of the corporation(:read private equity sponsor)

This end of easy credit might have far reaching consequences:

It might make it very difficult to refinance on better terms, and

It might also set in a stagnation of asset prices in all area's where asset prices where mostly fueled by cheap credit.

Such a situation of stagnating collateral values and expensive credit will probably result in defaults for the most vulnarable debtors, which might in turn set in a vicious circle of falling collateral values as collateral is sold to meet obligations to creditors, resulting in even more defaults spreading to less vulnerable classes of debtor. This all will become even worse due to the general economic slowdown it might generate.

And the real problem for financial markets will come once the above will start showing up in the assets of existing CDO's. Remember that we haven't heard yet of some big CDO blowing up, all the way to the senior tranches. Wat we are witnessing at the moment is some players blowing up because they are highly dependent on short term funding(like SIV's, conduit's) which has become scarce or because the market value of their structured finance portofolio has deteriorated(like hedge funds that face huge amount of redemptions or margin calls because they just announced that their credit trades went wrong)

This has mostly left unaffected players that are holding on to their structured credit securities and that do not care about the market value of those as they are not trading but rather holding them till maturity. 

In other words, CDO's are not blowing up yet, it is only the market value of their securities(their tranches, not their assets off course) that is falling.

But the problem is that now that nobody will buy any additional structured credit securities, this will probably result in deteriorations within the protofolio of current CDO in the next year or so. So my guess, the real troubles are only starting, and the question is what will happen to financial markets in general once CDO's start blowing up and even the senior tranches are affected?

Think of all the institutions that cannot exit their structured credit position as there is no secondary market liquidity. they are for now holding on to their position, which is probably so far so good unless they hold junior securities of mortgage related paper.  But if the assets of the CDO start to deteriorate heavily, and it results in losses on the whole capital structure, there is not much they can do. 

]]></description>
				</item>
	<item>
		<title>by: Pink Elephant</title>
		<link>http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2007/08/21/6727/the-full-subprime-letter-from-haymans-kyle-bass/#comment-5864</link>
		<pubDate>Thu, 23 Aug 2007 13:09:18 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2007/08/21/6727/the-full-subprime-letter-from-haymans-kyle-bass/#comment-5864</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[Thanks very much Gregory. I enjoyed reading the link you suggested and recommend it to others... 

By the way I tend to classify anything that tranches credit risk (even if MBS/ABS is the underlying) in the category CDO so I stand by my statement that it is effectively a CDO^2 that Mr Bass was talking about... But I'm sure we'll all be happy to park the question of whether a classic CDO is a type of ABS (where the asset is loan or bond debt) or whether tranched ABS is a type of CDO - Semantics isn't the issue here...

The key slides in the presentation you've linked us to are (for me) 
a) Slide 12 which shows a structure just like the one Mr Bass says exists. It claims Deutsche bank as a source although without naming a specific paper or issue so I still think the jury should stay out - To my mind you could immediately fix up the problem Mr Bass claims is infecting the world of finance just by mixing in other non-mortgage related assets or bonds into the collateral pool of the CDO on the right of slide 12 i.e. not JUST subprime CDO/ABS tranches... I still suspect that most structures are actually hybrid as it seems a cheap and obvious way to get a better rating and is bound to be much safer for everyone.
b) Slide 13 - It is quite correct to assert that correlations can change but I think this slide rather overstates the case - Unlike secondary market assets which become correlated 100% at times of trader distress (with the forced selling by traders themselves becoming the correlating agent) home owning people are not bought and sold by traders and are not clones... Even at the height of the great depression "only" 25% of people lost their jobs but if slide 13 was right 100% of people would have and we are not talking about a great depression since there isn't even a recession yet... People are not 100% correlated... Having said that "red flagging" the ratings agencies on this makes sense to me. How far back have the agencies checked correlations? Perhaps the author of slide 13 should check the data implicit in slide 7 - How far back have THEY checked correlations?? 
c) Slide 35... Taken at face value this completely negates Mr Bass's claim that “Well, when you lever ONLY mezzanine tranches of Subprime RMBS 10-20X, POOF…you magically have 80% of the structure rated “AAA” by the ratings agencies, despite the underlying collateral being a collection of BBB and BBB- rated assets…” - It seems there is no "ONLY" about it when you add Bond guarantors/insurers into the picture...

Still it's a very interesting piece to draw my attention to - Thanks Gregory

Who ever is left "holding the bag" let us not forget (at the risk of repeating myself) that nothing in the presentation changes the core fact that the leverage of some CDO tranches is always accompanied by de-leverage (and better ratings) in other tranches... The CDO merely refines and concentrates what is already there just as you can make gasoline from crude oil... I think we should all be careful not to stop driving just because "horror of horrors" what's left over after we make gasoline e.g. tar (c.f. equity tranche) isn't fit to put in the car (c.f. isn't investment grade because it is leveraged) - That is a truly irrelevant observation as is the comment on slide 14 of the presentation... Which brings me back to staying rational folks!  ]]></description>
				</item>
	<item>
		<title>by: gregory</title>
		<link>http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2007/08/21/6727/the-full-subprime-letter-from-haymans-kyle-bass/#comment-5833</link>
		<pubDate>Thu, 23 Aug 2007 10:54:05 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2007/08/21/6727/the-full-subprime-letter-from-haymans-kyle-bass/#comment-5833</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[Pink  Elephant, he's not talking about CDO squared but about CDO's whose assets are mostly BBB tranches of subprime ABS

you should check out this on the massive ripple effect(it also explains the CDO structure he's talking about btw) :
http://www.designs.valueinvestorinsight.com/bonus/pdf/IraSohnFinal.pdf

But off course you can be rational about this as well and say it's just another guy working hard to make sure his short position works out.

]]></description>
				</item>
	<item>
		<title>by: anon</title>
		<link>http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2007/08/21/6727/the-full-subprime-letter-from-haymans-kyle-bass/#comment-5816</link>
		<pubDate>Wed, 22 Aug 2007 14:01:23 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2007/08/21/6727/the-full-subprime-letter-from-haymans-kyle-bass/#comment-5816</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[Pink Elephant --  chill man]]></description>
				</item>
	<item>
		<title>by: Pink Elephant</title>
		<link>http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2007/08/21/6727/the-full-subprime-letter-from-haymans-kyle-bass/#comment-5815</link>
		<pubDate>Wed, 22 Aug 2007 13:47:51 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2007/08/21/6727/the-full-subprime-letter-from-haymans-kyle-bass/#comment-5815</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[By the way for the uninitiated anxiety ridden among you PLEASE LET ME PUT YOUR MIND AT REST and make one thing clear that I think you should know - 

****All CDOs do is repackage existing debt****

****REPEAT - All CDOs do is repackage existing debt****

That means:

a) THEY DO NOT INCREASE EXPOSURE IN ANY WAY AT ALL!! The "leverage" of some CDO tranches (of which Mr Bass speaks so casually) is ALWAYS accompanied by "de-leverage" (and better ratings) in other tranches... So it's not magic it's common sense

b) The total losses due to subprime delinquencies have therefore not been magnified by these structures and a pea sized problem will always stay pea sized - it certainly NEVER should lead to real "massive ripple effects" - Other than the waves of irrational anxiety we've seen that is (see my original post on ADs) ]]></description>
				</item>
</channel>
</rss>
